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BEING FRANK ABOUT THE FOURTH: ON 
ALLEN'S "PROCESS OF 
'FACTUALIZATION' IN THE SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE CASES" 
Wayne R. LaFave* 
Step aside, and I'll show thee a precedent . ... Francis! . . . Thou art 
perfect. . . . Francis! 
- 1 King Henry IV, act ii, scene 4 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Forthrightly About Frank 
An invitation to participate in a special issue for such an inestima-
ble personage as Francis Allen is itself a distinct honor - so much so, 
in fact, that refusal seems out of the question no matter what risks 
may attend this undertaking. The principal risk, as I see it, is that if 
one's contribution were to be assessed by a reader who, by virtue of 
this collection of essays, was also reflecting upon the writings of Allen, 
one is bound to come out the loser in any comparison. But I assume 
this risk, as substantial as it doubtless is in my case, so that I may join 
in the celebration of the remarkable accomplishments of an outstand-
ing law teacher and legal scholar over a career that has so far spanned 
almost forty years. 
It is my particular good fortune to have known Frank Allen all of 
my professional life. Indeed, we first met while I was still a law stu-
dent at the University of Wisconsin, courtesy of my mentor there, 
Frank Remington. Had I known then that I would someday be called 
upon for this performance, I most certainly would have chronicled the 
exact date of this initial encounter with one of the giants of the law 
teaching profession. But all that I can recall as I now peer back 
through the mists of antiquity is that this was an occasion (one of 
many) on which I did not distinguish myself. 1 A lesser man than Al-
"' David C. Baum Professor of Law and Professor in the Center for Advanced Study, Uni-
versity of Illinois. - Ed. 
1. My recollection, such as it is, is that I had accompanied Remington to the University of 
Chicago Law School to hear a talk on some aspect of criminal justice which was a part of the 
dedicatory proceedings for their new law building. We went to Allen's office, into which he had 
just moved, and chatted with him there. In a desperate effort to contribute at least some small 
talk to the conversation, I commented, nodding in the direction of four water or steam pipes 
running from floor to ceiling through the office, that this would be a nice office when it was 
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len might have consigned me to some sort of Gehenna for the witless, 
but he did not. Indeed, in the intervening quarter of a century our 
paths have crossed on numerous occasions, often at his doing and al-
ways to my benefit. 
I reveal no special insight when I assert that Frank Allen is truly 
an extraordinary individual. Putting aside his acute nomadism, which 
I have addressed on a prior occasion2 and with which he is now af-
flicted once again, 3 Allen has no fault known to me. He is an unpre-
tentious man in a profession where humility is in short supply. 
Moreover, it can truly be said (to turn Churchill's oft-quoted quip in-
side out) that Frank is a modest man who has nothing to be modest 
about. Over the years, despite the burdens of a variety of administra-
tive responsibilities he has assumed for his law school and his profes-
sion, Allen has been remarkably prolific. His writings, as I have 
already intimated, reflect a singular synthesis of erudition, elegance, 
and lucidity; no wonder, then, that his books and articles have so 
many admirers and so few equipollents. Allen is a man of grace, good 
humor, and uncommon common sense, and he always (well, almost 
always4) has about him an air of total unflappability. 
finished. Allen responded that it was finished. So much for my introduction to the marvels of 
modem architecture. 
I would like to believe that my faux pas had a subliminal effect upon Allen's career. Despite 
his vagabondage, see note 2 infra, Allen has had an uncommonly long tenure at a law school 
housed in what can only be described as a mausoleum. 
2. It fell to me to introduce Allen when he delivered the David C. Baum Memorial Lecture 
on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the University oflllinois College of Law on April 10, 1975. 
I stated in part: 
Allen graduated from Northwestern in 1946, from whence he moved to Washington to serve 
as law clerk to Justice Vinson during 1946-48, from whence he moved to Chicago to serve 
on the Northwestern faculty 1948-53, from whence he moved to Cambridge to be on the 
Harvard faculty 1953-56, from whence he moved to Chicago to be on the University of 
Chicago faculty 1956-62, from whence he moved to Ann Arbor to serve on the Michigan 
faculty 1962-63, from whence he moved to Chicago again to serve on the Chicago faculty 
1963-66, from whence he moved to Ann Arbor once again to be on the Michigan faculty 
(initially as dean), from whence he moved to Boston in 1974 to serve as a visiting faculty 
member at Boston College, from whence he moved back to Ann Arbor and the University of 
Michigan, where to the best of my knowledge he is presently in residence. Allen recently 
received the prestigious Mayflower Award for his enthusiastic and assiduous support of the 
moving and storage business. 
3. "Francis A. Allen, the Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law and former dean at the 
University of Michigan Law School, will occupy a $1 million endowed chair, the Huber C. Hurst 
Eminent Scholar Chair at the University of Florida College of Law this fall." SYLLABUS, June 
1986, at 4. 
4. Among my valued associations with Frank Allen is our work together on the Editorial 
Board for the four-volume Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice. One of the Board's meetings was 
held on the campus of Stanford University, and on the first day of this scheduled meeting I 
encountered Frank in the motel dining room at breakfast. He had a troubled look upon his 
visage, so uncharacteristic of one whose countenance customarily exudes unmitigated serenity. 
Allen then inquired as to my travels from the airport to the motel, explaining that he had paid 
what seemed to him an unduly stiff $50 for his taxi ride. With my characteristic honesty, which 
perhaps I should have disengaged on this occasion, I confessed that I had grabbed a city bus at 
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B. Frank Writes About the Fourth 
Elsewhere in these pages Yale Kamisar and Sanford Kadish 
thoughtfully examine the contributions of Francis Allen to the legal 
literature.5 Though I am one of the many who have profited from 
Frank's books and articles on a variety of topics, I wish to express a 
special debt of gratitude regarding his writings in my particular field of 
interest. For most of my life in academe, I have staked out as my 
favorite intellectual sandbox the fourth amendment - that is, the law 
concerning constitutional limitations upon search and seizure. This 
has long been the subject of my own (hopefully not Sisyphean) re-
search and writing. I continue to mine this particular vein of constitu-
tional law not merely because the subject fascinates me, but also 
because of my sense of the importance in our society of those rights 
guaranteed by the fourth amendment. In other words, I share the 
judgment of Justice Frankfurter that the fourth amendment occupies 
"a place second to none in the Bill of Rights."6 But whether one sub-
scribes to this seemingly discrepant fourth-is-first numeration or, in-
stead, is a literalist who believes that the fourth is really only fourth, 
there is no dissent from the conclusion that Frank Allen's contribution 
to the fourth amendment literature has been a most important and 
lasting one. 
Allen's welcome intrusions onto the fourth amendment scene have 
typically been prompted by some momentous development in this 
realm of jurisprudence. The circumstances of his birth were such7 that 
he was unable to publish an article on the occasion of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Weeks v. United States, 8 which erected a barrier in 
the federal courts to admission of evidence obtained in violation of the 
fourth amendment. But when the Court later, in Wolf v. Colorado, 9 
the airport and, upon depositing the paltry sum of fifty cents, had been transported to the street 
comer just steps from our motel. As Frank reflected on this 100:1 differential in the cost of this 
part of our respective travels, it was apparent that his bacon and eggs were not setting too well. 
This is about as flapped as I have ever seen Allen. 
This incident, I hasten to add, also caused me untold concern. It later occurred to me that 
under these circumstances a man of Allen's punctiliousness doubtless would, in submitting his 
travel expenses to our publisher, list only an expenditure of fifty cents for his airport-to-motel 
journey. How I now wish that I had possessed the presence of mind to assure him that this 
would be unnecessary because, on the basis of what I had just learned from him, my statement of 
expenses was going to read $50. 
5. Kamisar, Francis A. Allen: "Confront[ing] the Most Explosive Problems" and "Plumbing 
All Issues to Their Full Depth Without Fear or Prejudice," 85 MICH. L. REv. 406 (1986); Kadish, 
Francis A. Allen -An Appreciation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 401 (1986). 
6. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (dissenting opinion). 
7. The circumstance to which I refer is its timing; Allen was born five years after Weeks was 
handed down. 
8. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
9. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
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declined to recognize a similar constitutional barrier in the state 
courts, Allen responded with a masterful analysis of this develop-
ment.10 So too when Wolf was overruled in Mapp v. Ohio,·11 Allen 
was again quickly on the scene with a penetrating assessment of this 
landmark case.12 
Mention should also be made here of another fourth amendment 
piece13 penned by Frank Allen, a concise and pithy article based on 
remarks he delivered in 1960 at an International Conference on Crimi-
nal Law Administration. 14 At this talk, which I attended and vividly 
recall, Frank addressed the subject in his customary eloquent style, 
but there was not so much as a hint that a few months down the road 
the Supreme Court would be making history with the Mapp decision 
(so much for the infallibility of Frank Allen). 15 There was a good 
reason, of course, why Allen's crystal ball did not foretell this impen-
dency. Until the Supreme Court's decision was announced, Mapp 
seemed to be nothing more than a grubby little obscenity case. But 
then, as the dissenters bitterly complained, the majority "reached out,, 
to overrule Wolf. (How times have changed; nowadays the Court 
reaches out to constrict the Mapp exclusionary rule. 16) 
C. Frank's Right About the Fourth 
The depth and breadth of the analysis in Frank Allen's writings on 
the subject are such that those of us who have since labored in the 
fourth amendment vineyards have, for the most part, been able to do 
10. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. 
REV. 1 (1950). 
11. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
12. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf. 1961 SUP. Cr. REV. 
1. 
13. It should also be noted here that Allen has also addressed fourth amendment issues in 
some of his other writings of broader scope. See, e.g., Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: 
The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518. 
14. Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 246 (1961). 
IS. The later-published article, however, included an addendum taking note of the interven-
ing decision in Mapp. Id. at 253-54. 
Not long thereafter, Allen attempted to vindicate himself with the palliation that the Court 
had sneaked up on him (and the rest of us). "The fact is that Mapp did not come as the climax to 
an extended process of gradual weakening or attenuation of the Wolf rule. After all the clues are 
marshalled, the sense of surprise induced by the announcement of the Mapp decision remains." 
Allen, supra note 12, at 11. 
16. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 961-62 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting): 
It is probable, though admittedly not certain, that the Court of Appeals would now con-
clude that the warrant in Leon satisfied the Fourth Amendment if it were given the opportu-
nity to reconsider the issue in the light of Gates. Adherence to our normal practice 
following the announcement of a new rule would therefore postpone, and probably obviate, 
the need for the promulgation of the broad new rule the Court announces today. 
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no more than apply a contemporary sheen to A'llen's pearls (except, of 
course, when we are busy mixing metaphors). I find it not at all re-
markable that this should be so. Indeed, I would go so far as to say 
that anyone who has reason to address fourth amendment issues -
and I would include here the members of that august body formerly 
known as "The Nine Old Men" 17 - would be well advised to study 
and excerpt from Allen's timeless Wolf and Mapp articles. 
I do not question for a moment the sapience of Robert Benchley's 
bon mot that "the surest way to make a monkey of a man is to quote 
him."18 Nor do I doubt that quoting what a man has written twenty-
five or thirty-five years ago is the most likely route to this lower-prima-
tial state. But Frank Allen must be the exception who proves the rule, 
for his ratiocinations are just as cogent today as when they were writ-
ten. Indeed, if the intervening years prove anything, they show that 
the fourth amendment would be in much better health if Allen's views 
had achieved greater acceptance by the courts. Before turning to the 
main business of this Article, I should like to provide just two illustra-
tions, one from his 1950 Wolf critique and the other from his 1961 
exegesis of Mapp. 
1. Standing (and) (for) Deterrence 
In a skillfully crafted paragraph in his Wolf piece, Allen pointed 
out the inherent inconsistency in having an exclusionary rule 
grounded largely in considerations of deterrence and also, as to that 
rule, a standing requirement that a defendant's own right of privacy 
must have been invaded by the challenged search.19 That antilogy 
17. See Baker, The Ages of Person, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1981, at 23, col. 1, for a lucid 
explanation of why that term cannot be supplanted with any of the following: "eight old men 
and an old woman"; "eight old men and a spring chicken"; "eight old men and a lady"; and 
"eight old men and a person." He concludes: "Under the circumstances, ... the only possible 
phrase is 'eight old persons and a person.' Thus dies another lively phrase." 
18. R. FLESCH, THE NEW BOOK OF UNUSUAL QUOTATIONS 311 (1966). 
19. Perhaps the least justifiable of the limits on the scope of the exclusionary rule recog-
nized by the federal courts is that sanctioning the introduction of evidence in a criminal 
proceeding seized in violation of the rights of privacy of a third party. This limitation doubt-
less reveals the thought that the exclusionary rule should be conceived as conferring a kind 
of personal privilege to be asserted only by the individual whose rights of privacy have been 
invaded and, perhaps, manifests the origin of the exclusionary rule as the offspring of the 
"mystic union" of the Fourth Amendment and the privilege against self-incrimination de-
rived from the Fifth Amendment. But, obviously, the function of the exclusionary rule is 
not simply to confer a benefit upon the defendant in vindication of his rights of privacy 
which have already been invaded by governmental action, but to act as a restraining mea-
sure upon officials disposed to invade individual privacy in the future and, more broadly, to 
prevent the judicial power from being employed as an instrument for the lawless enforce-
ment of the criminal law. Insofar as these latter considerations are of importance it can 
make little difference whether the evidence in question represents the fruits of an invasion of 
the defendant's rights of privacy or whether it has been obtained in a manner inconsistent 
with the rights of any other person entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 
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persists today, for in the intervening years the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly expressed its unwillingness to broaden standing and thereby 
permit deterrence-via-exclusion to be effectuated in a wider range of 
circumstances. 
In Alderman v. United States, 20 the Supreme Court declined to 
adopt the version of standing accepted in People v. Martin, 21 whereun-
der a defendant in a criminal case could have suppressed even that 
evidence obtained in violation of the rights of others. (That rule pre-
vailed in the aptly-mottoed Eureka State until 1982, when it was refer-
endumed into oblivion by Proposition 8.22) The Court reasoned that 
whatever added deterrence would be gained by a Martin-type rule was 
not worth the "further encroachment upon the public interest" that 
would result. 23 Alderman was thus viewed as having marked the 
"point of diminishing returns"24 of the exclusionary rule, which is an 
attractive way of looking at the question. If the fourth amendment 
exclusionary rule is viewed in terms of "its broad deterrent pur-
pose, "25 then, so the argument goes, it is "a needed, but grudgingly 
taken, medicament; no more should be swallowed than is needed to 
combat the disease."26 How much is enough, however, is a hard ques-
tion, and can lead to the kind of speculation about deterrence-in-fact 
objurgated in the following subsection. But at least Alderman pro-
tected against certain results which had occurred under Martin that 
were themselves hard to swallow, such as that the defendant in a crim-
inal case is entitled to have excluded at his trial evidence acquired by 
police in violation of the rights of his victim. 21 
Allen, supra note 10, at 22 (footnotes omitted). 
20. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
21. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). For a useful study of the experience in California 
under the Martin rule, see Simons, Califomia's Rule of Vicarious Exclusion: Who May Challenge 
the Constable's Errors?, 19 SANTA Cl.ARA L. REV. 319 (1979). 
22. In 1982 California voters adopted an amendment to the state constitution providing, 
among other things: "[E]xcept as provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of 
the membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any 
criminal proceeding." CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 28(d). This was construed as having "abrogated ••• 
the 'vicarious exclusionary rule' under which a defendant had standing to object to the introduc-
tion of evidence seized in violation of the rights of a third person." In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 
873, 879, 694 P.2d 744, 747, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 634 (1985). 
23. Alderman, 394 U.S. at 175. 
24. Note, The Vicarious Exclusionary Rule in Califomia, 24 STAN. L. REV. 947, 958 (1972). 
25. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
26. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 
389 (1964). 
27. People v. Jager, 145 Cal. App. 2d 792, 303 P.2d 115 (1956), cited as an "extreme example 
of the California position" in Note, Standing Requirement of the Fourth Amendment -Anachro-
nism or Necessity?, 6 IDAHO L. REv. 131, 134 (1969), opposing the Martin rule. Compare 
Simons, supra note 21, at 346-47, taking the position that standing even in such circumstances is 
appropriate. 
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After Alderman, the question of whether a defendant should have 
standing because he was the target of a search directed at another was 
"regarded as an open question,"28 but it was abruptly closed in Rakas 
v. Illinois, 29 which rejected any such notion. In a remarkable passage, 
the Court reasoned that the unprosecuted victim of that search could 
seek other remedies (thus turning the Mapp analysis on its head), and 
expressed concern about the "substantial social cost" attendant appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule. 30 One might have expected some bal-
ancing of that supposed cost against the deterrent advantages of 
exclusion, by way of determining on which side of the "target" stand-
ing concept the. :'diminishing returns" of exclusion set in, but that did 
not happen. Instead, the Court adopted an individual rights approach 
to the fourth amendment,31 conveniently ignoring the fact that it had 
previously characterized the exclusionary remedy as "designed to safe-
guard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, 
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."32 
"Target" standing makes eminently good sense if otherwise "the 
Supreme Court's 'standing' rules [would] constitute an incitement to 
the police to conduct unconstitutional searches against small fish in 
order to catch big ones."33 Commentators have argued that there are 
recurring situations in which such trade-offs are made, 34 but any 
doubts on this point were certainly dispelled by the remarkable case of 
United States v. Payner. 35 There an IRS agent, knowing a Bahamian 
bank official would be in Miami, participated in a scheme whereby the 
banker's briefcase was stolen for a time to facilitate photographing of 
400 bank records therein. This led to information establishing that 
Payner and others had money in that bank not reported on their tax 
returns. As was unmistakably clear in the findings of the district 
court, 36 undisturbed by the court of appeals and the Supreme Court, 
28. United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 71 (2d Cir. 1973). 
29. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
30. 439 U.S. at 137. 
31. Doemberg, "The Right of the People": Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests 
Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259, 262 (1983), notes that Rakas was an-
other in a series of cases in which "the Court in recent years has oscillated between individual 
and collective views in the fourth amendment [exclusionary] rule area, but always in such a way 
as to narrow the amendment's effective ambit." 
32. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
33. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 433 (1974). 
34. See Burkoff, The Court That Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an In-
consistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151, 176-77 (1979); White & Greenspan, Stand-
ing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 333, 351-52 (1970). 
35. 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
36. The findings were that 
the Government and its agents, including Richard Jaffe, were, and are, well aware that 
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this criminal act and extreme violation of the banker's fourth amend-
ment rights37 was undertaken with full understanding by the IRS 
agent that a person such as Payner - precisely the kind of violator 
they were seeking - would have no standing to object. The Supreme 
Court, however, refused to reconsider its fourth amendment standing 
doctrine and then reversed the district court's exclusion of evidence 
under its supervisory power. As the three Payner dissenters quite cor-
rectly said of this holding that compels judicial impotency in the face 
of such scandalous conduct, it "effectively turns the standing rules cre-
ated by this Court for assertions of Fourth Amendment violations into 
a sword to be used by the Government to permit it deliberately to 
invade one person's Fourth Amendment rights in order to obtain evi-
dence against another person."38 
Allen's comments of over thirty-five years ago about deterrence 
and standing are most poignant when viewed against these more re-
cent developments. The complaint is not that the Supreme Court has 
failed to squeeze the very last ounce of deterrence39 out of the exclu-
under the standing requirement of the Fourth Amendment, evidence obtained from a party 
pursuant to an unconstitutional search is admissible against third parties who's [sic] own 
privacy expectations are not subject to the search, even though the cause for the unconstitu· 
tional search was to obtain evidence incriminating those third parties. This Court finds that, 
in its desire to apprehend tax evaders, .•• the Government affinnatively counsels its agents 
that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation pennits them to purposefully conduct an 
unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual in order to obtain evidence against 
third parties, who are the real targets of the governmental intrusion, and that the IRS agents 
in this case acted, and will act in the future, according to that counsel. 
434 F. Supp. 113, 131-33 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (footnote omitted). 
37. In a pre-Payner lecture on fourth amendment issues, I had occasion to discuss United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), holding that the defendant could not object to subpoenas 
ordering production by banks of "all records of accounts, i.e., savings, checking, loan or other-
wise, in the name of" defendant or his company, for the reason that he had no reasonable expec· 
tation of privacy as to what was in those documents, for they "contain[ed] only information 
voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of 
business." 425 U.S. at 437, 442. In expressing my lack of enthusiasm for the Miller rationale 
and result, I opined that if the Court's reasoning were taken seriously then this would mean the 
same result would obtain even if the police acquired the bank records without the bank's consent 
and by some extreme measures, such as burglary. The (admittedly hostile) audience almost 
hooted me from the podium for entertaining such flights of fancy. Payner, of course, is precisely 
such a case. 
38. 447 U.S. at 738 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.). 
39. The relevance in this context of the sempiternal verity that "an ounce of prevention is 
worth a pound of cure" is open to debate. Indeed, that is the very heart of the debate. The 
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court instructed in Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960), "is calculated to prevent, not to repair." If it is prevention we are 
talking about, then it might seem that every available ounce should be extruded from the exclu· 
sionary rule. But while it is indubitably accurate to say of the exclusionary rule that the "empha· 
sis is forward," Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 335, 
there is no escaping the fact that the apparent (even if not always actual) "immediate result is to 
free an obviously guilty person." Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: 
The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 331 (1973). It is the prospect of that more immediate 
consequence which doubtless has influenced the Supreme Court and lower courts to accept some· 
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sionary rule. Rather, it is that the standing doctrine has been fash-
ioned in such a way that it is actually working at cross-purposes with 
the deterrence objective. Nor, it should be added, is this a conse-
quence only of the Court refusing to enlarge upon previously recog-
nized standing doctrine. It is also reflected in those cases, such as 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 40 that rule on just what it takes to establish the 
"legitimate expectation of privacy" the Court said in Rakas was essen-
tial to standing. The Rawlings Court held defendant was without 
standing as to his then-companion's purse, into which he had placed 
narcotics, because he did not "have any right to exclude other persons 
from access to [that] purse."41 By thus using a consideration previ-
ously deemed relevant on the authority of a bailee to give valid con-
sent, 42 the Court produced the incredible result that whenever police 
could conduct a lawful search with the bailee's consent, they may in-
stead make that search without the bailee's consent because the bailor 
will lack standing.43 This is not only wrong, but also inconsistent with 
the Court's prior pronouncements on the law of standing.44 
2. Deterrence - Prove It! 
In his 1961 Mapp article, Allen took note of the longstanding 
"[d]ebate over the efficacy of the exclusionary rule," a matter that 
"can ultimately be answered only by empirical demonstration," but 
not now, for "no effective quantitative measure of the rule's deterrent 
efficacy has been devised or applied."45 Allen rightly saw this as an 
unhealthy state of affairs. As he put the matter on a subsequent occa-
sion: "The reason why the deterrence rationale renders the exclusion-
ary rule vulnerable is that the case for the rule as an effective deterrent 
of police misbehavior has proved, at best, to be an uneasy one."46 
The wisdom of this Allenism has been amply demonstrated by 
Yale Kamisar in an article which, like the present one, is cognomened 
thing less than every possible ounce of prevention. As Justice Traynor put it: "Of all the two-
faced problems of the law, there is none more tormenting" than this. Traynor, supra, at 319. 
40. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). 
41. 448 U.S. at 105. 
42. See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 8.6(a) (2d ed. 1987). 
43. As in Sussman v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 608 (Ky. 1980) {defendant had no stand-
ing regarding search of his girl friend's house, where he had left certain personal effects, includ-
ing a stash of drugs, as he had not limited his girl friend's use of the premises). 
44. For example, in Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1968), where the Court held 
an office worker had standing as to a search of records in an office used by him and his co-
workers, it was properly said to be "irrelevant" that his employer and fellow employees "might 
validly have consented to a search of the area where the records were kept." 
45. Allen, supra note 12, at 33-34. 
46. Allen, supra note 13, at 537. 
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with Allen's distinctive prose.47 That being the case, I shall not serve 
the reader a rechauffe here, but instead will offer only a few observa-
tions on the significance of Allen's point. One view is that it means the 
fourth amendment exclusionary rule must be seen as grounded not in 
notions of deterrence but rather in the broader proposition (as also 
stated in Mapp) that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional 
evidence.'' Kamisar argues this point with his characteristic bulldog 
tenacity,48 while others have vigorously taken the contrary position.49 
Wherever the truth lies in this dispute (notice how I have ab-
squatulated from that battleground with all haste), I would suggest 
that it is difficult to think about the fourth amendment exclusionary 
rule without also thinking about the objective of deterrence. (Even 
Kamisar once said - back when he was young and innocent, he might 
now protest - that he "would hate to have to justify throwing out 
homicide and narcotic and labor racket cases" if he "did not believe 
that such action significantly affected police attitudes and prac-
tices.''50) But the heart of the problem is exactly how one ought to 
think about deterrence and the fourth amendment. 
Allen's concern is with deterrence as "an empirical proposition,''51 
where an absence of hard proof of a deterrent effect in the particular 
case might well be taken as a reason for not excluding illegally ob-
tained evidence in that case. But that, it seems to me, is a cockeyed 
way for courts to look at deterrence. I am comfortable in thinking 
about the exclusionary rule in deterrence terms, but that is because I 
see the deterrence principle somewhat differently. For one thing, I 
find the question of whether the exclusionary rule (did) (could) deter 
in the particular case irrelevant, for the "exclusionary rule is not 
aimed at special deterrence";52 instead it is intended "to discourage 
law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth Amendment by 
removing the incentive to disregard it. "53 Moreover, the claim that the 
deterrent effect must somehow be proved in a particular instance "is 
merely a way of announcing a predetermined conclusion,"54 for with 
47. Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather 
Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983). 
48. Id. 
49. E.g., Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 918-22 (1986). 
50. Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. 
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 171, 179 (1962). 
51. Allen, supra note 12, at 34. 
52. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 709 
(1970). 
53. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976). 
54. Dworkin, supra note 39, at 333. 
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the exclusionary rule (as with the death penalty) it is "difficult to mea-
sure the occasions on which the deterrent has been successful."55 In 
the last analysis, then, I share the belief that deterrence "is partly a 
matter oflogic and psychology, largely a matter of faith. The question 
is never whether laws do deter, but rather whether conduct ought to 
be deterred."56 
For me, then, the ultimate proof of the wisdom of Allen's com-
ment is the Court's insistence on treating deterrence as "an ~mpirical 
proposition" in the sense discussed above. I have in mind such cases 
as United States v. Janis, 57 where, utilizing "common sense" in "the 
absence of convincing empirical evidence," the Court held the exclu-
sionary rule inapplicable in a civil suit by or against a sovereign other 
than that employing the searching officer, though in fact (as the dis-
senters recognized) such a result could only fortify the existing pattern 
"of mutual cooperation and coordination"58 whereby evidence ille-
gally seized by state officers was being silver-plattered59 to federal offi-
cials for use in enforcing their tax laws. Similarly in INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza 60 the exclusionary rule was held inapplicable in a civil de-
portation hearing, in part because INS agents know "that it is highly 
unlikely that any particular arrestee will end up challenging the law-
fulness of his arrest,"61 though (as Justice White noted in dissent) so 
concentrating on deterrence of individual agents "neglects the 'sys-
temic' deterrent effect that may lead the agency to adopt policies and 
procedures that conform to Fourth Amendment standards."62 
II. THE NEED FOR "FACTUALIZATION" 
The inspiration for this Article comes from the following para-
graph, written by Frank Allen in 1950: 
So long as the Court feels itself compelled to resolve [fourth amend-
ment] issues by choosing one set of social values to the exclusion of the 
other, any decision must inevitably leave the law in a state of unstable 
equilibrium. In other types of civil liberties litigation there may be evi-
55. Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 736, 
739 (1972). 
56. Dworkin, supra note 39, at 333. 
57. 428 U.S. 433, 457, 459 (1976). 
58. 428 U.S. at 462 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
59. The reference, of course, is to the so-called "silver platter'' doctrine, under which state 
police could tum the fruits of their illegal searches over to federal authorities for use in federal 
courts; the doctrine was abolished in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), and has now 
been partially revived in Janis. 
60. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
61. 468 U.S. at 1044. 
62. 468 U.S. at 1054 (White, J., dissenting). 
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dence that these tensions are relaxing due to the increasing ability of the 
Court to narrow the issues for adjudication, thereby eliminating choices 
between such drastic alternatives. Thus by a process of "factualization" 
it may be increasingly easier to recognize that the problem of freedom of 
speech in an industrial dispute is not altogether the same problem as that 
involving the right of the political candidate to make his views known to 
the electorate, and that the right of the unlicensed newspaper publisher 
to be free from governmental supervision in the circulation of ideas may 
not involve precisely the same implications as the issue of governmental 
supervision of the quality of programs put on the air by the licensee of a 
radio wave length. However that may be, this process of "factualiza-
tion" in the search and seizure cases has not proceeded far. Conse-
quently, those cases present in particularly stark relief a conflict of social 
values typical to a greater or lesser extent of the dilemmas faced by the 
Court in the whole movement toward increasing judicial protection of 
the basic individual liberties. 63 
When those words were written, the fourth amendment landscape 
was rather barren. Thus it could quite accurately be said, as Allen 
does, that while the Court had come to appreciate that not all forms of 
speech were entitled to precisely the same kind and degree of first 
amendment protection, there had not yet developed a full understand-
ing that not every form of search or of seizure should be subject to 
precisely the same kind and degree of fourth amendment limitation. 
Rather, the Court's decisions for the most part treated the fourth 
amendment "as a monolith: wherever it restricts police activities at 
all, it subjects them to the same extensive restrictions that it imposes 
upon physical entries into dwellings. To label any police activity a 
'search' or 'seizure' within the ambit of the amendment is to impose 
those restrictions upon it."64 
Moreover, at the time of Allen's 1950 assessment, the Court's ef-
forts to erect at least some guideposts on the fourth amendment ter-
rain had not been especially successful. Consider what the Court had 
said over a span of thirty-five years concerning the permissible scope 
of search incident to arrest: Dictum first approved search of the "per-
son, "65 then for what might be "found upon his person or in his con-
trol,"66 and then more broadly of the person and "the place where the 
arrest is made. " 67 This was followed by a holding allowing search of 
"all parts of the premises" where an arrest for contemporaneous crim-
inal conduct was made, 68 which was succeeded in tum by the seeming 
63. Allen, supra note 10, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). 
64. Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 388 (footnote omitted). 
65. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
66. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925). 
67. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). 
68. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927). 
December 1986) ''Factualization,, in Search and Seizure 439 
discordancies that a search incident to arrest was impermissible when 
of the office where the arrest occurred, 69 permissible when of a four-
room apartment in which the arrest was made, 70 impermissible when 
of a farm building in which the arrest happened,71 and permissible 
when of an office in which the arrest was accomplished.72 Little won-
der that Justice Frankfurter was moved to aphorize, upon tal<lng note 
of this remarkable bit of nonsequaciousness, that "the course of true 
law pertaining to searches and seizures ... has not ... run smooth."73 
In the succeeding thirty-five years or so the Court has added one 
more case to that series, 74 still another shift75 which, however, seems 
to "have legs~:. in the show-biz sense.76 During this same span the 
Court has handed down a profusion of cases which, collectively, have 
substantially accomplished a "factualization" of the fourth amend-
ment. This more recent fourth amendment jurisprudence has not al-
ways "run smooth" either, though it is fair to say that in this modem 
era the Court's search and seizure decisions have been marked by a 
greater degree of consistency than is reflected in the above summary. 
These cases, or at least some of them, are not without their analytical 
and practical difficulties (about which more in a moment), but viewed 
in their totality they reflect a most desirable trend: the ongoing devel-
opment and elaboration of two most important fourth amendment 
principles, namely (1) that not every search and not every seizure must 
be grounded in the traditional quantum of evidence suggested by the 
amendment's "probable cause" requirement, and (2) that not every 
search and not every seizure is "unreasonable" (in the sense in which 
that word is used in the amendment) merely because the warrant pro-
cess was not utilized. 
III. LESSER GROUNDS FOR SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has on several occasions recog-
nized that the police are entitled to conduct certain types of searches 
69. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). 
70. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
71. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). 
72. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
73. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
74. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
75. The Court in Chime/ held the warrantless search of the arrest premises may not "go 
beyond the area from which the person arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary items." 
395 U.S. at 766. 
76. Though Chime/ might appear to be in at least some jeopardy as a consequence of the 
Court's adoption of a broader rule as to search of vehicles incident to arrest in New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), Belton purports to be grounded in considerations unique to vehicles. 
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and seizures, though they are admittedly actions subject to the re-
straints of the fourth amendment, 77 upon a less demanding factual ba-
sis than had often been required theretofore. Though it is not at all 
uncommon for these situations to be characterized as searches and 
seizures conducted without probable cause, 78 it is much more precise 
to say that they are searches and seizures permitted on something less 
than the traditional quantum of probable cause.79 These searches and 
seizures may be usefully further classified by placing them into three 
categories, the first two of which have a common antecedent. 
Category (1) involves those searches and seizures allowed upon the 
basis of what is most commonly referred to as "reasonable suspicion" 
- a case-by-case ascertainment of some likelihood that the seizure or 
search will be fruitful, which, however, as a matter of probabilities 
need not rise to the level of traditional probable cause. Category 
(2) involves those searches and seizures which are permitted without 
any case-by-case suspicion at all, provided they are carried out pursu-
ant to some established routine and in that sense are neither accusa-
tory nor arbitrary in nature. Both categories are grounded in the 
Supreme Court's so-called "balancing test," and thus together raise 
difficult issues about just how and in what circumstances such balanc-
ing is to be conducted. 
Category (3), on the other hand, has to do with certain searches 
and seizures which are permitted simply because of their nexus to 
other lawful fourth amendment activity. Most commonly found in 
this category are instances in which a search is allowed merely because 
it is contemporaneous with, or at least in some sense "incident to," the 
making of a seizure. Sometimes, however, it is a seizure that is permit-
ted because of its adjunction to a coincident search. But all of the 
cases in this category are grounded in a common assumption: that 
this added authority must be "piggy-backed" in this way onto the 
power to make the underlying seizure or search because a more metic-
77. Another important part of the "factualization" process not discussed in this Article has 
to do with when the police conduct falls outside the fourth amendment and thus is subject to no 
constitutional restraints whatsoever. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) ("factory 
surveys" in effort to find illegal aliens at their workplaces not a search or seizure); United States 
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (insertion of "beeper" in container before its sale and later use of 
same to follow car no search or seizure). It is this aspect of the Court's "factualization" process 
which perhaps has been least satisfactory. Many of the activities deemed outside the fourth 
amendment entirely, such as those involved in the two cases just cited, would better be viewed as 
inside the amendment but subject to lesser limitations, as with the activities discussed herein. 
78. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 706 (1981) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (assert-
ing there are "two types of seizures that need not be based on probable cause"). 
79. This circumvents the complaint made by Justice Douglas in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 36 
(1968) (dissenting opinion}, that the majority had permitted the police on their own to do what a 
magistrate could not permit via warrant, as a warrant requires probable cause. 
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ulous definition of the "incident to" authority would unduly compli-
cate an already complex situation. The cases in this third category, 
then, all involve the bedeviling question of when resort to "bright 
lines" is appropriate in defining police authority. 
A. Reasonable Suspicion 
1. Brief Seizure of Persons 
Back in the "monolith" days of the fourth amendment, the lawful-
ness of a street encounter between an officer and a suspect was usually 
determined by the rather mechanical process of ascertaining whether 
an "arrest" had occurred. 80 But any seizure was treated as ipso facto 
and, to be sure, ipso jure an "arrest,''81 which resulted in a most un-
healthy situation. Necessary police power to investigate suspicious cir-
cumstances was consequently unavailable, except as it was conferred 
by either of two less than desirable means: manipulation of the sub-
stantive criminal law to overcome this procedural difficulty;82 or wa-
tering-down of the grounds needed to make any arrest. It is thus fair 
to say that in its "factualization" of the fourth amendment, the 
Supreme Court's most profound contribution was its seminal decision 
of Terry v. Ohio. 83 
As is now generally known, the Court in Terry utilized its balanc-
ing test, defined the year before in Camara v. Municipal Court 84 in 
terms of "balancing the need to search against the invasion which the 
search entails,'' by applying it now to the common police practice of 
detaining suspicious persons briefly on the street for purposes of inves-
tigation. The thrust of Terry and its progeny may be expressed in 
these terms: The requirement of probable cause is a compromise for 
accommodating the opposing interests of the public in crime preven-
tion and detection, and of individuals in privacy and security. 85 The 
same compromise is not called for in all situations, and thus this bal-
ancing process should take account of precisely what lies in the bal-
80. E.g., People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 194 N.Y.S. 326 (N.Y. Sp. Sess. 1922). 
81. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1957) (holding the suspect had 
been arrested when taken by an officer to a nearby call box); United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 
837, 840 (D.D.C. 1959) (holding that the suspect had been arrested when taken from the street to 
his nearby apartment, as "the term arrest may be applied to any case where a person is taken into 
custody or restrained of his full liberty, or where the detention of a person in custody is contin-
ued even for a short period of time") (quoting Long v. Ansell, 69 F.2d 386, 389 (D.C. Cir. 
1934)). 
82. See LaFave, Penal Code Revision: Considering the Problems and Practices of the Police, 
45 TEXAS L. REV. 434, 451 & n.77 (1967). 
83. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
84. 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). 
85. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
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ance in a given case. Because one variable is the degree of imposition 
on the individual, it may be postulated that less evidence is needed to 
meet the probable cause test when the consequences for the individual 
are less serious. Thus, it may be concluded that a brief on-the-street 
seizure does not require as much evidence of probable cause as one 
which involves taking the individual to the station, as the former is 
relatively short, less conspicuous, less humiliating to the person, and 
offers less chance for police coercion than the latter. This means that a 
Terry stop, as the Court none too helpfully put it in that case, is proper 
"where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him rea-
sonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity 
may be afoot."86 As the Court later elaborated in United States v. 
Cortez, 87 though no "self-defining" verbal formula exists, the essence 
of the standard is that "the detaining officers must have a particular-
ized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of 
criminal activity." 
If there are to be two tiers88 of probable cause, a higher level for a 
full-fledged arrest and a lower one for a Terry stop, then quite obvi-
ously it is essential to the effective and fair functioning of this scheme 
that there exist a rational means for distinguishing between these two 
varieties of fourth amendment activity. Terry set the tone for develop-
ments along this line by making it clear that the matter was not to be 
decided merely on the basis of the labels chosen by the police or by the 
state; as one commentator put it, the Court in Terry "dissipated the 
notion that the search and seizure provisions of the fourth amendment 
are subject to verbal manipulation."89 If it walks like a duck, quacks 
like a duck, and flys like a duck, then it must be a duck! The Court 
said as much in Dunaway v. New York, 90 where the defendant con-
fessed after being picked up and brought to the station for a brief pe-
riod of questioning. Though he had not been told that he was under 
arrest and had not been booked, the Court wisely rejected the state's 
claim that only the lesser quantum of evidence for a Terry stop was 
needed. The Court reasoned that "the detention of petitioner was in 
86. 392 U.S. at 30. 
87. 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). 
88. Without necessarily suggesting that the balancing which permits something less than the 
traditional quantum of probable cause will inevitably require exactly the same amount of evi-
dence, the Court has declined to adopt more than two verbal standards, reasoning that "subtle 
verbal gradations may obscure rather than elucidate the meaning of the provision in question." 
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985). 
89. Remarks of Justice Walter V. Schaefer at Institute of Continuing Legal Education pro· 
gram on "Criminal Law and the Constitution: The Expanding Revolution," Ann Arbor, Michi· 
gan, July 19, 1968. 
90. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
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important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest," as he 
"was not questioned briefly where he was found" but instead was 
"transported to a police station" and "would have been physically re-
strained if he had refused to accompany the officers or had tried to 
escape their custody."91 Just as wisely, the Supreme Court has quite 
correctly concluded that it is appearances rather than intentions which 
should govern on this issue, so that a brief seizure may pass muster as 
a Terry stop even when the officer viewed the event as the initial stage 
of a full-fledged arrest.92 
This is not to suggest that placing a particular set of facts within 
the proper compartment of the now-dimerous "seizure" category is 
always easy. Consider Florida v. Royer, 93 where a suspected drug cou-
rier was lawfully questioned in an airport concourse and then required 
to accompany the police about forty feet to a small police office, where 
he consented to a search of his suitcases after they were obtained from 
the airline and brought to the room. Although the total lapsed time 
was fifteen minutes, the four-Justice plurality concluded that the con-
sent was the fruit of an illegal arrest. Some of the plurality's language 
suggests these Justices viewed the situation as equivalent to a taking to 
a police station a la Dunaway, for it was stressed that Royer was held 
in "a police interrogation room." But they placed greater emphasis 
upon the asserted requirements that a Terry stop "last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop" and that "the inves-
tigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reason-
ably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short 
period of time."94 These requirements were not met here, the plurality 
reasoned, as "the primary interest of the officers was . . . in the con-
tents of his luggage,"95 and thus they could have more expeditiously 
sought consent on the spot or could have used a narcotics detection 
dog, available at the airport, to check out the suitcase.96 This "least 
intrusive means" inquiry has a great potential for mischief, especially 
if a court goes about it in the fashion of the Royer plurality. The plu-
rality appears to have assumed that use of a detection dog is inevitably 
"more expeditious," though in fact such dogs are not always readily 
91. 442 U.S. at 212. 
92. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985). 
93. 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
94. 460 U.S. at 500. 
95. 460 U.S. at 505. 
96. Brennan, J., concurring, while unwilling to concede that use of trained narcotics dogs 
would be less intrusive, expressed a view which - if anything - was even more demanding: 
"[A] lawful stop must be so strictly limited that it is difficult to conceive of a less intrusive means 
that would be effective to accomplish the purpose of the stop." 460 U.S. at 511 n. *. 
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available (as the Court learned later that Term97). Similarly, the 
Royer plurality also implied that seeking consent is not expeditious. 
In fact, however, a consent might be very promptly obtained or, if not 
or if there is not time for a search before the suspect's flight departs, he 
might be allowed to go his way and the investigation continued at his 
destination (again, as the Court learned later that Term98). Fortu-
nately, the Supreme Court has more recently cautioned against "un-
realistic second-guessing," and has declared that the "question is not 
simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the 
police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it."99 
2. Brief Seizure of Effects 
Certainly the lesser-intrusion-ergo-lesser-suspicion concept of 
Terry has application in some other settings as well. Thus, for exam-
ple, the Court in United States v. Place 100 properly applied the Terry 
balancing of interests approach in concluding that the luggage pos-
sessed by reasonably suspected drug couriers at airports could be 
seized and detained while further investigation (typically, exposure of 
the suitcases to a drug-detection dog) was conducted. Place illustrates 
the care with which the Terry balancing process must be undertaken. 
The Court most wisely cautioned that "in the case of detention of lug-
gage within the traveler's immediate possession, 101 the police conduct 
intrudes on both the suspect's possessory interest in his luggage as well 
as his liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary," in that "such a 
seizure can effectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the 
possible disruption of his travel plans in order to remain with his lug-
gage or to arrange for its return." 102 For this reason, the Court con-
cluded in Place, "the limitations applicable to investigative detentions 
of the person" also apply here. 103 In other words, the container may 
be detained without full probable cause only as long as could the sus-
97. In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), the suspect's luggage was held for 90 
minutes so that it could be taken from LaGuardia Airport to Kennedy Airport where such a dog 
was available. 
98. In Place, the suspect promptly consented to a search of his bags in Miami, but he was 
allowed to depart instead because his flight was about to leave; the investigation was continued in 
New York City. 462 U.S. at 698-99. 
99. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687 (1985). 
100. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
101. As compared to a situation like that in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 
(1970), upholding a longer detention of a mailed package because the invasion did not intrude 
upon either a privacy interest in the contents of the packages or a possessory interest in the 
package. 
102. 462 U.S. at 708. 
103. 462 U.S. at 709. 
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pect from whose possession it was taken, so that the suspect at his 
option may also remain at the place of the seizure for that length of 
time and then reclaim the container, unless in the interim the suspi-
cion has blossomed into probable cause. 
3. Limits of the Category 
Just how far the Terry balancing approach should be pushed so as 
to permit certain seizures or searches on reasonable suspicion rather 
than full probable cause is unclear, though it would seem that in New 
Jersey v. T.L.0. 104 the Court reached - if it did not surpass - the 
limit. T.L.O. holds that "the Fourth Amendment' applies to searches 
conducted by school authorities,"105 but that such warrantless 
searches are permissible if the search of the student was justified at its 
inception (i.e., by "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search 
will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either 
the law or the rules of the school") and reasonable in scope (i.e., by 
measures "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not 
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the 
nature of the infraction").106 But the Court's reasoning leaves much 
to be desired. 
For one thing, the Court justified its departure from usual fourth 
amendment standards by noting that "drug use and violent crime in 
the schools have become major social problems,"107 but yet promul-
gated a search standard (as Justice Stevens bemoaned) that makes "a 
search for curlers and sunglasses in order to enforce the school dress 
code ... just as important as a search for evidence of heroin addiction 
and violent gang activity."108 For another, the T.L.O. majority simply 
assumed that the "school setting also requires some modification of 
the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search,"109 an 
assumption not justified by the facts of T.L. 0. itself (or, indeed, the 
reported school search cases generally110), where the available evi-
dence sufficed to meet the traditional probable cause test. Finally, the 
majority's balancing analysis is largely silent on the degree-of-intru-
sion point, understandably prompting the dissenters to say of the case, 
which involved a vice principal's search into a female student's purse, 
104. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
105. 469 U.S. at 337. 
106. 469 U.S. at 342. 
107. 469 U.S. at 339. 
108. 469 U.S. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
109. 469 U.S. at 340. 
110. See 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note 42, at§ 10.ll(b). 
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that it cannot be squared with the principle "that probable cause is a 
prerequisite for a full-scale search."111 
B. Standardized Procedures 
1. Inspection of Premises 
The seminal standardized-procedures case is Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 112 where the Court ruled that a search warrant was required for 
nonconsensual health and safety inspections of residential premises, 
but then held that such a warrant could issue despite the absence of 
any facts tending to show that code violations existed in the premises 
to be inspected. Specifically, the Court decided 
that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reason-
able legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area in-
spection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such 
standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, 
may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a 
multifamily apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but 
they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condi-
tion of the particular dwelling. 113 
In the companion case of See v. City of Seattle, 114 the same result was 
reached as to commercial premises. 
The result reached in Camara, arrived at by "balancing the need to 
search against the invasion which the search entails,"115 is sound. The 
case thus stands as another very important contribution to the "factu-
alization" of the fourth amendment. However, the Court's discussion 
of the "persuasive factors" in the balance leaves something to be de-
sired, and reflects just how easy it would be for courts to run amuck 
with this balancing test and, in the process, to balance the fourth 
amendment away entirely. Consider, for example, the statement in 
Camara that "the public interest demands that all dangerous condi-
tions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvas-
sing technique would achieve acceptable results."116 It is difficult to 
accept this asserted need for "universal compliance" with housing 
code standards as a justification for a diluted probable cause test; one 
might just as cogently argue that there is a need for universal compli-
ance with the criminal law and that the public interest demands that 
all dangerous offenders be convicted and punished. As four of the 
111. 469 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
112. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
113. 387 U.S. at 538. 
114. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
115. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. 
116. 387 U.S. at 537. 
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Camara majority had noted on an earlier occasion: "Health inspec-
tions are important. But they are hardly more important than the 
search for narcotic peddlers, rapists, kidnappers, murderers, and other 
criminal elements."117 A more fruitful line of analysis, therefore, 
would focus instead upon the Camara Court's asserted need for "ac-
ceptable results." Criminal law enforcement typically is directed to-
ward aggressive conduct, most often occurring in public places, which 
usually leaves a trail of discernible facts. As a consequence, the tradi-
tional probable cause test has not proved to be a bar to an acceptable 
level of criminal law enforcement, as the instances are rare in which 
the preparation, commission, and all evidence of an offense are con-
fined to the offender's private premises. By comparison, most housing 
code violations occur within private premises, cannot be detected from 
outside, and are not brought to the attention of the authorities by com-
plaint. It is these facts which support the Court's expression of doubt 
"that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable 
results." 
Another Camara factor is that "the inspections are neither per-
sonal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime" and 
consequently "involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citi-
zen's privacy."118 Though this might be read to mean that a lesser 
quantum of evidence will suffice when the object of the search is not 
criminal prosecution, such an interpretation would be unfortunate and 
erroneous. As four members of the Camara majority put it in an ear-
lier case, an individual's interest in privacy "would not appear to fluc-
tuate with the 'intent' of the invading officers."119 Thus a more 
appropriate interpretation of this Camara factor is that a lesser quan-
tum of evidence suffices for these inspections because the search in-
volved is less of an intrusion on personal privacy and dignity than that 
which generally occurs in the course of criminal investigation. This is 
a real and meaningful distinction. Code inspections (in contrast to the 
typical search for evidence of crime) are completed quickly, involve no 
rummaging through the private papers and effects of the householder, 
and do not result in a seizure. Also, while a police search for evidence 
brings with it "damage to reputation resulting from an overt manifes-
tation of official suspicion of crime,"120 a routine inspection that is 
117. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 382 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, 
C.J., and Black and Brennan, JJ.). 
118. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. 
119. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by War-
ren, C.J., and Black and Douglas, JJ.). 
120. Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 28 u. CHI. L. REV. 664, 701 (1961). 
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part of a periodic or area inspection plan does not single out any one 
person as the object of official suspicion. 
The third "persuasive factor" stated in Camara, that code inspec-
tion "programs have a long history of judicial and public accep-
tance," 121 is vulnerable from the point of view of both accuracy and 
cogency. As for longstanding judicial acceptance, the fact of the mat-
ter is that before Camara the few cases reaching the appellate courts 
focused almost exclusively on the warrant-no warrant issue. As for 
the longstanding public acceptance, it is more accurately described (as 
it was on an earlier occasion by four members of the Camara majority) 
as a "history of acquiescence."122 In any event, a similar or even 
greater showing of judicial and public acceptance did not deter the 
Court in Camara from finding warrantless search procedures constitu-
tionally deficient. (Just as vulnerable is the assumption that if a busi-
ness is "pervasively regulated" it may for that reason be inspected 
without traditional probable cause. As Justice Rehnquist has noted, 
the Court would inexorably invalidate an inspection scheme to check 
premises for drug activity, "despite the fact that Congress has a strong 
interest in regulating and preventing drug-related crime and has in 
fact pervasively regulated such crime for a longer period of time than 
it has regulated mining."123) 
2. Operation of Checkpoints 
A standardized-procedures rationale has the most going for it 
when, by virtue of those procedures, the resulting lesser intrusion (be 
it seizure or search) (i) is not perceived by the individual affected or by 
others as accusatory in nature, and (ii) is not open to the possibility 
that it was either a consequence of arbitrary selection or the manifesta-
tion of some ulterior motive. This is why what might be characterized 
as the "all who pass here" variety of standardized procedures consti-
tutes the epitome of this genre of fourth amendment activity. Illustra-
tive is the operation of a highway checkpoint at which all vehicles are 
stopped for brief questioning of the occupants about their possible ille-
gal alienage, upheld in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 124 and the 
stopping of all traffic at a roadblock for the purpose of checking 
driver's licenses and vehicle registration, approvingly viewed in Dela-
ware v. Prouse. 125 On the basis of Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse, lower 
121. 387 U.S. at 537. 
122. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 384 n.2 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
123. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 608 (1981) (concurring opinion). 
124. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
125. 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (dictum). 
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courts have not surprisingly upheld such other checkpoint procedures 
as the airport hijacker detection system, 126 roadblocks to detect drunk 
drivers, 127 and the screening of persons entering public buildings 
where security is a legitimate concem.128 
3. Limits of the Category 
Quite clearly, as is apparent from Justice Rehnquist's observation 
quoted above, this standardized-procedures approach cannot be ex-
tended to all forms of investigative activity so as, in effect, to subvert 
totally the fourth amendment's probable cause requirement. But the 
Court's process of "factualization" has not identified as yet the bound-
aries of the Camara principle, and suggestions are to be found that it 
might sometimes be applied in more traditional law enforcement con-
texts. In Brown v. Texas, 129 holding the random and groundless stop-
ping of a person on the street for questioning unconstitutional, the 
Court asserted that for such activity to pass constitutional muster 
there must be either reasonable suspicion or "the seizure must be car-
ried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on 
the conduct of individual o:ffi.cers."130 Just how seriously this language 
should be taken is unclear; Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse are cited in 
support, but in those cases (as with Camara itself) the Court was deal-
ing with some special and unique governmental and public interests 
which could not be adequately served if even a case-by-case reasonable 
suspicion standard were required. It is thus to be doubted that neutral 
"plans" dealing generally with certain constant law enforcement con-
cerns, such as drug trafficking, will emerge and be found sufficient 
under the Camara principle. More likely, as some lower court cases 
illustrate, 131 is that a stopping without individualized suspicion but 
pursuant to a plan will be upheld if the plan addresses a somewhat 
"special" problem existing at a certain time and place. 
C. Nexus to Other Lawful Fourth Amendment Activity 
1. On ''Bright Lines" 
This third category of seizures and searches without traditional 
probable cause is of the "piggy-back" variety; that is, the search or the 
126. E.g., People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 524 P.2d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974). 
127. E.g., State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983). 
128. E.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 383 Mass. 655, 421 N.E.2d 447 (1981). 
129. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
130. 443 U.S. at 51. 
131. E.g., People v. Meitz, 95 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 420 N.E.2d 1119 (1981); see also United 
States v. Palmer, 603 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1979). 
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seizure is deemed permissible, even absent any probable cause showing 
as to it, because it accompanied some other lawful seizure or search. 
The so-called "search incident to arrest" is the prime example. The 
recognition of this "piggy-back" authority has commonly been justi-
fied on the ground that a more particularized statement of authority to 
make an incidental search or seizure would of necessity be so compli-
cated and ambiguous as to be beyond the comprehension of the police. 
This third category, then, raises the profoundly important question of 
whether this "process of 'factualization' " that Allen talks about 
should always entail a very particularized and thorough evaluation of 
the unique facts of the individual case, or whether on the other hand it 
is sometimes appropriate to set out the rules for police conduct in 
terms of general categories - that is, by employing "bright lines." 
There are some settings in which it is quite apparent that having 
the constitutional limits on police authority set out by bright lines is 
meritorious. The Supreme Court has often spoken favorably of its Mi-
randa doctrine as "a bright-line rule,"132 which it most certainly is and 
which unquestionably is one of its greatest virtues. The police know 
exactly what is expected of them. But when the Court-declared bright 
line is not stated in terms of an obligation on the police to do some-
thing to protect a person's rights, as is the case in Miranda, but rather 
in terms of authority in the police to take some affirmative action bene-
fi.cial to them in a general category of cases (e.g., that the person of an 
arrestee may always be searched incident to arrest), then the wisdom 
of the bright line is less apparent. One view, as I have elsewhere ex-
pressed it, is that 
if our aim, as stated in the fourth amendment, is to ensure that "the 
people" are "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures," then it may well be that the rules 
governing search and seizure are more in need of greater clarity than 
greater sophistication. And thus, as between a complicated rule which 
in a theoretical sense produces the desired result 100% of the time, but 
which well-intentioned police could be expected to apply correctly in 
only 75% of the cases, and a readily understood and easily applied rule 
which would bring about the theoretically correct conclusion 90% of the 
time, the latter is to be preferred over the former. As someone once put 
it, an ounce of application is worth a ton of abstraction. 133 
But this is hardly a universally acclaimed proposition. Professor Al-
schuler, for one,134 has responded to the above with this: "Not only 
132. E.g., Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 n.1 
(1985). 
133. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an lmpelfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" 
and "Good Faith," 43 U. PITI. L. REV. 307, 321 (1982). 
134. Some members of the Supreme Court have also expressed concerns, such as that "ini· 
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do categorical fourth amendment rules often lead to substantial injus-
tice; in addition, their artificiality commonly makes them difficult, not 
easy, to apply." 135 I shall not renew that debate here; suffice it to note 
that I still believe (to put the proposition in Justice White's words) 
that "[b]right-line rules are indeed useful and sometimes necessary," 
but that "the Court should move with some care" in creating them. 136 
Doubtless one's affinity for a particular bright line depends to some 
extent on whose ox is being gored. Thus Justice Rehnquist, author of 
the seminal bright-line decision in United States v. Robinson, 137 was 
nonetheless moved to declare via dissent in another case "that proba-
bly any search for 'bright lines' short of overruling Mapp v. Ohio is apt 
to be illusory. Our entire profession is trained to attack 'bright lines' 
the way hounds attack foxes." 138 But even apart from where one's 
predilections or prejudices lie, certainly some bright-line rules have 
more going for them than others. The point may be illustrated by 
comparing Robinson with New York v. Belton. 139 
2. How Bright and How Right? 
In Robinson, the Court held that the "general authority" to search 
a person incident to arrest is "unqualified." In other words, incident 
to a custodial arrest the police may make a full contemporaneous 
search of the person of the arrestee, without regard to the likelihood in 
the individual case that the search was necessary (Le., to find and se-
cure evidence, to seize weapons and thus prevent escape). This result 
is sound, for such a bright-line rule is to be preferred over a case-by-
case-determination approach when the police activity at issue involves 
relatively minor intrusions into privacy, occurs with great frequency, 
and virtually defies on-the-spot rationalization on the basis of the facts 
of the individual case. Search of an arrested person is precisely that 
kind of police activity: (a) it is the most common variety of police 
search practice and occurs under an infinite variety of circumstances; 
(b) despite probable cause to arrest, it does not necessarily follow that 
tially bright-line rules" ultimately disappear "in a sea of ever-finer distinctions," Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 265 (1983) (White, J., concurring), which themselves may be unsound because the 
bright line, by its nature detached from principle, fails "to guide the police and the courts in their 
application of the new rule to nonroutine situations." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 471 
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
135. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. 227, 231 
(1984). 
136. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 15 (1982) (White, J., dissenting). 
137. 414 U.S. 218 .(1973). 
138. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
139. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
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there is also probable cause the arrestee presently has evidence of that 
crime with him or presently is armed, which are much more complex 
and difficult determinations; (c) the decision to search an arrestee's 
person cannot be made with the degree of forethought and reflection 
possible for most other search decisions, as the circumstances arise 
from the arrest itself, which is often unanticipated, and the fact of 
arrest produces an immediate need to search if the self-protective and 
evidence-saving functions are to be realized; and (d) search of the per-
son is a relatively minor intrusion upon a person who, by hypothesis, 
has already been subjected to the more serious step of arrest. More-
over, the frisk alternative put forward by the court of appeals would 
not suffice to accomplish the self-protection objective during the arres-
tee's subsequent transportation to the station. 
Before any supposed bright-line rule is adopted by the Court, it 
would be well to test the proposed rule by asking these questions: 
(1) Does it have clear and certain boundaries, so that it in fact makes 
case-by-case evaluation and adjudication unnecessary? (2) Does it 
produce results approximating those which would be obtained if accu-
rate case-by-case application of the underlying principle were practica-
ble? (3) Is it responsive to a genuine need to forgo case-by-case 
application of a principle because that approach has proved unwork-
able? ( 4) Is it not readily subject to manipulation and abuse? The 
supposed "workable rule" of Belton, namely, "that when a policeman 
bas made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, 
be may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the pas-
senger compartment of that automobile," including "the contents of 
any containers found within the passenger compartment,"140 flunks on 
all counts. 
On the first point, the Belton line is none too bright, for it leaves 
unresolved such questions as how close to the time of arrest such a 
search may be made and whether "interior" includes such places as a 
locked glove compartment or the interior of door panels. As for the 
second point, Belton accepts "the generalization that articles inside the 
relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an auto-
mobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into 
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or eviden-
tiary ite[m],' " 141 while the truth of the matter is that any number of 
commonplace events142 can put the passenger compartment beyond 
the arrestee's control. And with respect to the third point, the fact of 
140. 453 U.S. at 460 (footnotes omitted). 
141. 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 
142. Including immediate removal of the arrestee to a patrol car or some other place away 
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the matter is that applying the Chime! test143 is actually easier in auto-
mobile cases than in others, as the police typically can and do remove 
the arrestee from the vehicle and thereby ensure that he has no further 
control over the passenger compartment. That is, the "difficulty" and 
"disarray" alluded to by the Belton majority has been more a product 
of the police seeing how much they could get away with than of their 
being confronted with inherently ambiguous situations. Finally, and 
concerning point four, the new rule is open to manipulation and abuse; 
as Justice Stevens correctly noted, now an officer may opt to make a 
custodial arrest "whenever he sees an interesting looking briefcase or 
package in a vehicle that has been stopped for a traffic violation," as he 
thereby gains "the constitutional predicate for broader vehicle 
searches than any neutral magistrate could authorize by issuing a war-
rant." 144 Belton, then, is the consummate example of the "piggy-
back" bright-line approach gone awry, and proof positive of the adage 
that "the chief cause of problems is solutions."145 
It is worth noting at this point that there are some search and 
seizure rules which can be said to involve a combination of this 
"piggy-back" category and the previously discussed standardized-pro-
cedures category. Illustrative is the holding in South Dakota v. Opper-
man 146 that a vehicle may be inventoried incident to its lawful seizure, 
but only "in accordance with standard procedures in the local police 
department"; and the ruling in Illinois v. Lafayette 147 that an arres-
tee's effects may be inventoried at the station, but only pursuant to 
"standardized inventory procedures." Though even as so limited the 
Opperman and Lafayette holdings are not beyond question, there is no 
denying the fact that the mandating of standardized procedures in ad-
dition to the "piggy-back" relationship marks a significant limitation 
upon the power the police might otherwise exercise. Indeed, it is fair 
to say that were the Court in other circumstances to combine the 
"piggy-back" and standardized-procedures requirements in other 
ways, the results would again be a more meaningful accommodation 
of law enforcement and privacy interests. For example, in Robinson 
from his own vehicle, handcuffing the arrestee, closure of the vehicle, and restraint of the arrestee 
by several officers. 
143. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), the Court upheld "a search of the 
arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate control' - construing that phrase to mean 
the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 
144. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 452 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
145. I owe this observation to Eric Sevareid. 
146. 428 U.S. 364, 375 (1976) (emphasis in original). 
147. 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983). 
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- or, more precisely in its companion case of Gustafson v. Florida, 148 
where the issue was more directly presented - the Court might well 
have required that the arrest itself, albeit on probable cause, be in ac-
cordance with standardized procedures. That is, the Court might 
have required that this "custodial arrest," to which it was attaching an 
automatic right to search the person, have been made pursuant to 
either legislation or police department regulations which established 
some rational scheme for determining when a noncustodial alternative 
(i.e., a citation) should and should not be utilized as the means for 
invoking the criminal process.149 
The Court's failure to do so - the failure to perceive the difference 
between Robinson, where the officer was acting pursuant to detailed 
police regulations, 150 and Gustafson, where the officer was free to 
arrest or ticket as he saw fit - meant that it missed the chance to 
make "the greatest contribution to the jurisprudence of the fourth 
amendment since James Otis argued against the writs of assistance in 
1761."151 This is because absent such a limitation there exists the sig-
nificant risk that police will arrest for minor offenses merely to avail 
themselves of the opportunity to make a valid search despite their lack 
of either a warrant or probable cause. Experience has shown that such 
pretexts are difficult to uncover, 152 and in any event - as the Supreme 
Court now views matters - the unlikely establishment of an illegiti-
mate police motivation would not itself invalidate the incidental 
search. 153 That being the case, if the Court had imposed a standard-
ized-procedure requirement onto the custodial arrest itself, the "piggy-
back" rule of the Robinson case would have been much more palat-
able, and that of the Belton case would have been at least less 
objectionable. 
3. Limits of the Category 
As with the first two categories of seizures and searches without 
probable cause, it may appropriately be asked of this "piggy-back" 
category how far the concept may legitimately be pushed without seri-
148. 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
149. See Folk, The Case for Constitutional Constraints Upon the Power to Make Full Custody 
Arrests, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 321 (1979). 
150. The regulations are set out in United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1097 n.23 
(D.C. Cir. 1972). 
151. Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 416. 
152. The pretext is not likely to be acknowledged by the police, and the circumstantial evi-
dence (e.g., in Robinson that the officer apparently knew of the defendant's prior narcotics con-
victions) is typically inconclusive. 
153. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
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ously undercutting the fourth amendment's usual probable cause re-
quirement. Worth noting on this point is Michigan v. Summers, 154 
where, in contradistinction to such cases as Robinson and Belton, it 
was a seizure that was "piggy-backed" onto a search. The police in 
that case stopped defendant as he was about to leave premises at 
which they had just arrived to execute a narcotics search warrant, de-
tained him within while the warrant was executed, arrested him when 
narcotics were found on the premises, and then found heroin in his 
pocket. In holding the heroin admissible, the Summers majority ruled 
that "a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause 
implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants 
of the premises while a proper search is conducted."155 
Although the Court in Summers relied on Terry (rather than 
Robinson and Belton) in support of that holding, it is important to 
note at the outset that the Court did not merely extend the Terry rea-
sonable suspicion rule to the search warrant context. That is, Summers 
is truly a category (3) case, not a category (1) case, for what the 
Court's holding does is to "piggy-back" the occupant's detention onto 
the search warrant execution, rather than to justify it by the level of 
suspicion in the particular case. As the Summers majority empha-
sized, the rule there promulgated "does not depend upon such an ad 
hoc determination, because the officer is not required to evaluate either 
the quantum of proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion 
to be imposed by the seizure."156 To state the proposition another 
way, while the Court explains its rule in terms of three significant gov-
ernment interests ("the legitimate law enforcement interest in prevent-
ing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found," 
"minimizing the risk of harm to the officers," and "the orderly com-
pletion of the search, [which] may be facilitated if the occupants of the 
premises are present"), 157 the police need not assess whether detention 
is necessary to serve those interests in the particular case. This is be-
cause, once again, by the "piggy-back" approach the Court has ruled 
that the police may always detain persons found at the premises named 
in a search warrant, provided only that (i) the warrant authorizes a 
"search for contraband," and (ii) the persons detained are "occu-
pants" (elsewhere referred to by the Court as "residents," and thus 
154. 452 U.S. 692 (1981). 
155. 452 U.S. at 705 (footnote omitted). 
156. 452 U.S. at 705 n.19. 
157. 452 U.S. at 702-03. 
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apparently meaning not anyone present158 but rather occupants in the 
literal sense159). 
If Summers is assayed in the fashion I have previously examined 
Robinson and Belton, it comes off rather well. The "piggy-backed" 
authority in those cases was a full search of the person and of the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle, respectively, while here it is the 
temporary detention of a person within his own home. Such a deten-
tion, even if longer than that permissible on the street corner under 
Terry, still might be characterized as a relatively minimal intrusion, 
though it is fair to say that the undefined temporal aspect of the Sum-
mers rule160 is its weakest point. That problem aside, the Summers 
rule makes a good deal of sense, for it describes a general category in 
which the government interests identified by the Court (especially the 
first and most important of the three) are likely to be served. It is not 
certain that the contraband named in the warrant will be found, nor is 
it certain that its discovery and other relevant facts will in every in-
stance add up to probable cause to arrest the then-present occupant.161 
But the likelihood of these consequences in all cases falling within the 
general rule of Summers is sufficiently strong to permit the detention 
for some period of time in the interest of "preventing flight in the 
event that incriminating evidence is found." 162 
Yet the three dissenters163 in Summers challenge the majority's 
analysis every step of the way. In response to the majority's assertion 
that Terry and subsequent stop-and-frisk cases establish that "some 
seizures" which constitute "limited intrusions" may "be made on less 
than probable cause,"164 the Summers dissenters argue that such a de-
parture from the probable cause standard is permissible only in special 
circumstances, namely, when there is present "some governmental in-
terest independent of the ordinary interest in investigating crime and 
apprehending suspects, an interest important enough to overcome the 
presumptive constitutional restraints on police conduct."165 They 
158. The Court referred to the category as "residents" who ordinarily would in any event 
"remain in order to observe the search of their possessions." 452 U.S. at 701. 
159. The dictionary definition is one "who occupies," that is, resides as an owner or tenant at 
a "particular place or premises." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1560 
(1971). 
160. As the dissenters pointed out, execution of a warrant even in a limited space can take 
considerable time. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (FBI search of one· 
bedroom apartment for burglary tools and pair of checks consumed five hours). 
161. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 42, at§ 3.6(c). 
162. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702. 
163. Stewart, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ. 
164. 452 U.S. at 699. 
165. 452 U.S. at 707 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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found only "two isolated exceptions" in the Court's prior decisions: in 
Terry, the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to 
assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed 
with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against 
him."; 166 and in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 167 "the unique gov-
ernmental interest in preventing the illegal entry of aliens." 168 
But this simply is not so. Terry and its progeny cannot be ex-
plained simply as frisk cases; they are stop-and-frisk cases. As Justice 
Harlan wisely pointed out in his concurring opinion in Terry, "if the 
frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with 
a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on 
an encounter, to make aforcible stop. Any person, including a police-
man, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous."169 Thus, 
Terry cannot be distinguished in terms of the "special" interest in self-
protection, 170 for that interest arises only if it is already concluded that 
there is a basis to seize a suspect without full probable cause in the 
interest (to use the words of the Summers dissent) of "investigating 
crime and apprehending suspects."171 And it has not been seriously 
contended that Terry stops may be made only when it is suspected that 
the person being investigated is "armed and dangerous."172 
Having said all that, however, it may be suggested that the dissent-
ers' objections would have carried somewhat greater force if they had 
not been misled by the majority into viewing Summers as of the Terry 
genre. Once again, it is not; Terry permits detention upon reasonable 
suspicion, while Summers permits detention when "piggy-backed" 
onto execution of a search warrant for contraband. Its consanguinity 
is thus with Robinson and Belton, not Terry. Had the Summers dis-
senters appreciated that fact, they could have made their argument 
more convincingly, for the Robinson and Belton cases do rest in large 
part on the premise that broadly stated search authority is appropriate 
when the risk of error under a case-by-case-evaluation-of-facts ap-
proach is a bullet in the gut and not just the loss of evidence. This 
suggests that in the Court's future efforts at "factualization" of the 
166. 452 U.S. at 707 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968)). 
167. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
168. Summers, 452 U.S. at 706 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
169. 392 U.S. at 32. 
170. Indeed, the first government interest relied upon in Terry was "that of effective crime 
prevention and detection." 392 U.S. at 22. 
171. Any notion that Terry is limited to prevention of as yet uncommitted crimes has been 
rejected by the Court. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985). 
172. Even possible limitations where the stop is for a past crime, pondered in Hensley, do not 
go this far. 
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fourth amendment, the issue which ought to be addressed regarding 
the boundaries of category (3) is whether "piggy-backing" (which, af-
ter all, makes unnecessary not only traditional probable cause but also 
reasonable suspicion) should be permitted only to serve the interest of 
self-protection, or whether other interests may also be taken into ac-
count, at least when (as in Summers) the police activity onto which the 
added fourth amendment power is being "piggy-backed" has the prior 
authorization of a magistrate. 
IV. W ARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 
The fourth amendment declares a proscription against "unreason-
able searches and seizures," and then states that "no Warrants shall 
issue" except upon a certain showing and with certain specificity. As 
with constitutional provisions generally, the amendment has "both the 
virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity."173 Among these ambigui-
ties is whether seizures and searches are (sometimes) (always) unrea-
sonable because made without a warrant. 
Resort to the warrant process can be beneficial to a fair and effec-
tive system of criminal justice in a variety of ways. For one thing, it 
permits the critical probable cause determination to be made in rela-
tively calm circumstances by a judicial officer, a person the Supreme 
Court has usually perceived as more knowledgeable on these matters 
than the cop on the beat.174 The warrant process, the Court instructs, 
"interposes an orderly procedure"175 involving ''judicial impartial-
ity"176 whereby a "neutral and detached magistrate"177 can make "in-
formed and deliberate determinations"178 on the issue of probable 
cause. To leave such decisions to the police, says the Court, is to allow 
"hurried action"179 by those "engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime."1so 
Even assuming that this judicial scrutiny is not all that it is cracked 
up to be, the process of obtaining a warrant serves an important re-
cording function. By the very fact that the police must commit them-
173. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 42 (1966). 
174. But see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983), asserting that warrants are "issued by 
persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who certainly do not remain abreast of each 
judicial refinement of the nature of 'probable cause.' " 
175. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). 
176. Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51. 
177. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
178. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964). 
179. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110. 
180. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14. 
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selves in advance to a statement of facts, usually in writing, 181 the 
warrant process serves "to facilitate review of probable cause and 
avoid justification for a search or an arrest by facts or evidence turned 
up in the course of their execution."182 Absent this pre-search or pre-
seizure memorialization of the facts being relied upon to justify the 
fourth amendment activity, there is the risk that the police will engage 
in post hoc manipulation of the facts in an effort to justify their action. 
Also, even if the police are paragons of virtue, there is nonetheless a 
significant chance that the probable cause facts will not be accurately 
reported if the occasion for communicating them to a judge comes 
only months later in the context of a suppression hearing.183 
By virtue of the Supreme Court's recent narrowing of the exclu-
sionary rule in United States v. Leon, 184 the warrant process now 
serves yet another function: that of substantially reducing the chances 
that evidence acquired by a search or a seizure will later be sup-
pressed. This is because Leon holds that "the Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the 
prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in 
reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neu-
tral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable 
cause."185 This good faith exception, provided it is confined to with-
warrant cases, 186 would thus seem to "give law enforcement officers 
some solid encouragement to employ the warrant process for all 
searches and arrests which are not made on an emergency basis."187 
The Supreme Court has long expressed a strong preference for 
searches made pursuant to a search warrant.188 Indeed, the Court as-
serted on one occasion "that the police must, whenever practicable, 
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures."189 But this 
is far from being an accurate portrayal of current law or practice. 190 
181. This is the prevailing practice, though apparently it is not required by the fourth amend-
ment. See United States v. Goyett, 699 F.2d 838 (6th Cir. 1983). 
182. Jones v. United States, 5 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2124, 2126 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Leventhal, 
J., dissenting), revd. on rehearing sub nom. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 
1970). 
183. See, for example, the situation discussed by Ely, J., dissenting in Boyer v. Arizona, 455 
F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1972). 
184. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
185. 468 U.S. at 900. 
186. Some members of the Court are prepared to go further. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Men-
doza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (White, J., dissenting). 
187. P. Johnson, New Approaches to Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 10 (Working Paper, 
Sept. 1978). 
188. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). 
189. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). 
190. See Bloom, The Supreme Court and Its Purported Preference far Search Warrants, 50 
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Though there exists some degree of confusion as to just when a war-
rant is required, 191 it is fair to say that warrantless searches and 
seizures are the norm and that resort to the warrant process is the 
exception. 
This branch of the Supreme Court's "factualization" of the fourth 
amendment conveniently divides into two categories. Category (1) has 
to do with those instances in which the warrant requirement is im-
practical, that is, when there exist what the Court likes to call "exigent 
circumstances." As we examine that category, we shall see that the 
Court's measurement of the exigencies has not been entirely consis-
tent. Also, we shall see another "bright-lines" problem - now, 
whether ascertaining when exigent circumstances are present in a cer-
tain category of cases is so difficult that the warrant requirement must 
be forgone entirely as to those cases. 
Category (2), on the other hand, has to do with those instances in 
which the protections of the warrant process are deemed unnecessary. 
Initially, that might seem to be a contradiction in terms. After all, if 
the police activity in question is encompassed within the fourth 
amendment's protections, if the warrant process is the preferred man-
ner of proceeding, and if by definition the case is one in which exigent 
circumstances are admittedly lacking, then why not require a warrant? 
The Supreme Court has never answered this question, and perhaps 
there exists no completely satisfactory answer. It may be, however, 
that this state of affairs makes some sense in terms of not overloading 
the warrant process. A greatly expanded warrant system - that is, 
one which truly adhered to the principle that arrest and search war-
rants are required whenever practicable - might convert that process 
into somewhat of a mechanical routine, one in which the judiciary 
would "not always take seriously its commitment to make a 'neutral 
and detached' decision as to whether there exist grounds for a 
search."192 Simply stated, the proposition being suggested here is this: 
as a practical matter, it may well be that the warrant process can serve 
TENN. L. REv. 231 (1983); Bloom, Warrant Requirement- The Burger Court Approach, 53 U. 
CoLO. L. REV. 691 (1982). 
191. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468 (1985), takes 
note of this confusion and then puts forward as an alternative the following: 
[A] warrant is always required for every search and seizure when it is practicable to obtain 
one. However, in order that this requirement be workable and not be swallowed by its 
exception, the warrant need not be in writing but rather may be phoned or radioed into a 
magistrate (where it will be tape recorded and the recording preserved) who will authorize 
or forbid the search orally. By making the procedure for obtaining a warrant less difficult 
(while only marginally reducing the safeguards it provides), the number of cases where 
"emergencies" justify an exception to the warrant requirement should be very small. 
Id. at 1471. 
192. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 120 (1967). 
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as a meaningful device for the protection of fourth amendment rights 
only if used selectively to prevent those police practices which would 
be most destructive of fourth amendment values. If there is at least 
something to that point, then it is useful to examine the Supreme 
Court's decisions in this category (2) for the purpose of identifying and 
assessing just what it is that the Court takes into account in prioritiz-
ing various fourth amendment interests. 
A. Warrant Requirement Impractical 
Whatever benefits or advantages are thought to inure from resort 
to the warrant process, quite clearly it makes no sense to require a 
warrant when the very act of obtaining it would in all likelihood frus-
trate the purpose of the intended seizure or search. The Supreme 
Court has thus long recognized that when such "exigent circum-
stances" are present, the police may forgo a warrant and instead im-
mediately make a warrantless search or seizure. An especially apt 
illustration of this point is Schmerber v. California, 193 where the Court 
held that though a search warrant is ordinarily required "where intru-
sions into the human body are concerned," no warrant was needed to 
take a blood sample from an apparently intoxicated driver for the sim-
ple reason that the percentage of alcohol in the blood would be signifi-
cantly diminished if testing were delayed until a warrant could be 
obtained. But not all cases are as easy as Schmerber, and as a conse-
quence the Court has sometimes experienced difficulty in gauging the 
existence or nonexistence of the requisite "exigent circumstances," and 
on other occasions has rightly or wrongly created a "bright-line" rule 
to obviate the necessity for police and courts to assay exigencies on a 
case-by-case basis. 
1. Overstated and Underestimated Exigencies 
That the Supreme Court's exigent circumstances assessments are 
not all of a kind is perhaps not surprising; indeed, it may well be ar-
gued that this is the way it should be, for exigencies cannot be weighed 
in the abstract but must be considered in the context of the particular 
fourth amendment interests which would be invaded by the intended 
arrest or search. One would expect, therefore, as has been the case, 
that any claimed exigencies would receive the closest scrutiny when 
the challenged police conduct was entry of private premises. Many 
years ago the Court acknowledged that a warrantless search of prem-
ises might be upheld upon a showing of "exceptional circum-
193. 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966). 
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stances,"194 but no such circumstances were found to exist in that case 
or in others that soon followed. 195 The issue lay dormant for several 
years, as in the pre-Chime! days the problem was usually overcome by 
the simple expedient of making an arrest on the premises and then 
searching the place incident to arrest. 
Then came Vale v. Louisiana. 196 Police set up a surveillance of a 
house in which Vale was thought to be residing, because they had two 
warrants for his arrest issued after his bond had been increased on a 
pending narcotics charge. When another person drove up to the house 
and sounded his horn, Vale came out, walked to the car and had a 
conversation with the driver, looked about cautiously, entered his 
house, came back out a few minutes later, looked about again, and 
proceeded to the car. Convinced that they had just witnessed a sale of 
narcotics, the officers approached. Vale hurried back toward the 
house while the driver of the car started away. The driver was appre-
hended, but not before he swallowed some object. Vale was arrested 
on his front steps, after which the police took him inside and made a 
cursory inspection of the house to ascertain if anyone else was present. 
Minutes later, Vale's mother and brother entered the premises, at 
which point the police searched the house and found a quantity of 
narcotics in a rear bedroom. The state argued the search was support-
able as one made on probable cause and in response to the risk that 
someone in the premises might dispose of the narcotics before a war-
rant could be obtained, but the Supreme Court disagreed: 
Such a rationale could not apply to the present case, since by their own 
account the arresting officers satisfied themselves that no one else was in 
the house when they first entered the premises. But entirely apart from 
that point, our past decisions make clear that only in "a few specifically 
established and well-delineated" situations, ... may a warrantless search 
of a dwelling withstand constitutional scrutiny, even though the authori-
ties have probable cause to conduct it. The burden rests on the State to 
show the existence of such an exceptional situation. . . . And the record 
before us discloses none. 
The officers were able to procure two warrants for Vale's arrest. 
They also had information that he was residing at the address where 
they found him. There is thus no reason, so far as anything before us 
appears, to suppose that it was impracticable for them to obtain a search 
warrant as well. 197 
194. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
195. E.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 
451 (1948). 
196. 399 U.S. 30 (1970). 
197. 399 U.S. at 34-35. 
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This is a truly remarkable passage. What is the significance of the 
fact "that no one else was in the house when they first entered"? If the 
notion is that the risk of destruction of the evidence by Vale's brother 
or mother was somehow lessened by the fact the officers beat them 
into the premises by a few minutes, then it seems totally indefensible. 
If it means that the police, now having discovered the premises were 
empty, could have maintained that condition until a warrant was ob-
tained, then surely something more specific about the authority of po-
lice to bar persons from their own homes was in order.198 As for the 
contention that the police could have obtained "a search warrant as 
well" when they got the two arrest warrants, the facts support pre-
cisely the opposite conclusion. A search warrant for narcotics could 
not have been obtained on that prior occasion, as the probable cause 
had just developed minutes before the search. Precisely because the 
Court plays fast and loose with the facts in this way, Vale's contribu-
tion to Allen's "process of 'factualization' " is virtually nil. Perhaps 
the Court believed, as a lower court put it on a later occasion, 199 that 
the risk of destruction of evidence by a family member should not 
count as an exigent circumstance because that kind of risk is so preva-
lent that it would virtually wipe out the warrant requirement for 
premises searches. But if that is the point of Vale, it would have been 
well for the Court forthrightly to assert it. 
As it is, the Court does not clearly state in Vale just what it takes 
to amount to exigent circumstances in this context, though it may be 
that a limitation was intended to be expressed in the observation that 
in the instant case the "goods ultimately seized were not in the process 
of destruction."200 But even this part of Vale can hardly be said to be 
a useful "factualization." Lower courts have found it so unrealistically 
narrow that they have in the main not accepted it as controlling. 
Rather, they have stated the exception in broader terms, such as a 
"great likelihood that the evidence will be destroyed or removed 
before a warrant can be obtained,"201 that the evidence is "threatened 
with imminent removal or destruction,"202 or that the police "reason-
ably conclude that the evidence will be destroyed or removed before 
they can secure a search warrant."203 
198. Even today clear guidance is lacking. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984). 
199. United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.) cen. denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970). 
200. 399 U.S. at 35. 
201. State v. Patterson, 192 Neb. 308, 316, 220 N.W.2d 235, 240 (1974). 
202. United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50, 54 (8th Cir. 1973). 
203. United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 1973). 
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Vale is as sophistic in one direction as Chambers v. Maroney 204 is 
in the other. As a prelude to Chambers, it should be noted that many 
years before, in Carroll v. United States, 205 the Court upheld a war-
rantless search of a vehicle being driven on the highway and reason-
ably believed to contain contraband, reasoning that it was "not 
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly 
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be 
sought."206 That was a fair conclusion on the facts of that case, for the 
car's travels could not have been interrupted by the expedient of ar-
resting the occupants; the suspected crime was only a misdemeanor, 
and at that time and place a misdemeanor arrest not directly observed 
could be made only with a warrant, which the police lacked. But in 
Chambers the Court applied the Carroll rule to a situation in which 
true exigent circumstances were lacking. The occupants of the vehicle 
had already been arrested and were incarcerated, and the search of the 
vehicle was undertaken at the station after it was in the custody of the 
police and not accessible to anyone but the police. That, however, did 
not deter the Court from this astonishing statement: "The probable-
cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility 
of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure 
of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is se-
cured."207 The failure of Chambers to then address the "unless" por-
tion of that sentence left a mile-wide hole in the Court's analysis, just 
as was true of the omission in Vale of any discussion of a police power 
to impound the premises. Fortunately, as we shall see shortly, the 
Court ultimately dropped the exigent circumstances pretext in Cham-
bers-type cases and now allows warrantless searches of vehicles on an-
other theory. 
2. Impossible or Unnecessary? 
What the very last observation in the preceding paragraph means 
is that of the divaricate bases for forgoing a warrant, the automobile 
cases now belong in category (2) rather than category (1). It is well to 
note, however, that this transfer has not occurred in other circum-
stances where most likely it should, so that there persist situations in 
which the Supreme Court claims that exigent circumstances are the 
reason why warrantless searches are being permitted, when in fact 
some other consideration would provide a more convincing explana-
204. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
205. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
206. 267 U.S. at 153. 
207. 399 U.S. at 52. 
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tion for why a warrant is not necessary. Witness the line of cases hav-
ing to do with inspection of business premises, where again there has 
been a tendency to overstate what circumstances are in fact "exigent." 
Donovan v. Dewey, 208 upholding a warrantless inspection scheme for 
mines, is illustrative. Starting with the congressional finding that 
safety hazards in mines can be easily concealed, the Court took this to 
mean that "unannounced, even frequent, inspections" were necessary, 
which in turn led the Court to the conclusion that therefore a warrant 
requirement would "frustrate inspection."209 Because the execution of 
a warrant is ordinarily "unannounced," in the sense that the suspect is 
not earlier advised of the application for or issuance of the warrant, 
the Court's frustration contention must relate to the need for "fre-
quent" inspections. But if, as the Court earlier noted in Marshall v. 
Barlow's, Inc., 210 a need for frequent inspections does not mean fre-
quent search warrant applications because most businessmen will co-
operate and permit the inspection when the inspector first appears sans 
warrant, then it is still not apparent that a warrant requirement, lim-
ited to the few cases in which the inspector is turned away, would 
"frustrate" the program. This may mean, then, that cases such as 
Dewey actually stand for the proposition that in this area the feasibility 
of obtaining a warrant has little or nothing to do with whether a 
fourth amendment warrant requirement should exist. That may be a 
rational conclusion, but if it is, the proposition needs to be expressed 
via a process of "factualization" different from that found in these in-
spection cases to date. 
If that is a rational conclusion, presumably it is because the consti-
tutional necessity for a search warrant in this context is best judged by 
an inquiry into whether a warrant requirement would be of any signifi-
cant benefit to businessmen, rather than into whether it would impose 
any significant burden on the government. The Dewey decision sug-
gests this approach, for the Court there found it "difficult to see what 
additional protection a warrant requirement would provide."211 This 
lack of benefit, the Court said in effect, was because the regulatory 
scheme itself sufficiently cautioned the inspector and forewarned the 
businessman of the frequency and scope of the inspections instead of 
"leaving the frequency and purpose of inspections to the unchecked 
discretion of Government officers. "212 Even if this latter conclusion is 
208. 452 U.S. 594 (1981). 
209. 452 U.S. at 603. 
210. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
211. 452 U.S. at 605. 
212. 452 U.S. at 604. 
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not free from doubt, the approach of inquiring into the benefits of a 
search warrant in a particular business inspection scheme is a promis-
ing one. This is especially so if the Supreme Court disentangles the 
need-for-warrant and standard-for-inspection issues as to business in-
spections, which it has not yet done.213 Once they are separated, mak-
ing it clear that whatever grounds are needed to inspect must be 
present either with or without a warrant, cases like Dewey would be 
easy. A warrant is clearly of no benefit where by statute or accepted 
practice a superior procedure - a pre-search adversary hearing - is 
utilized in lieu of the ex parte application. 
3. More on ''Bright Lines" 
As noted earlier,214 one of the most troublesome and at the same 
time most important issues which exists about how Allen's "process of 
'factualization' in the search and seizure cases" should be accom-
plished has to do with the utility and fairness of using "bright lines" to 
define the boundaries of permissible fourth amendment activity. We 
have already examined the use of such bright lines to describe devia-
tions from the traditional probable cause test. What remains at this 
point is to take note of the bright-lines approach in demarcating ex-
cusal of the warrant process. 
In United States v. Watson, 215 the Supreme Court held that no 
warrant was ever needed to make an arrest in a public place,216 no 
matter how easy it might have been in a particular case for the police 
to have armed themselves with an arrest warrant in advance. The 
main thrust of the case was that such a conclusion was consistent with 
the common law, a point hotly disputed by the Watson dissenters. It 
could be said of Watson, then, what one commentator said of a related 
Supreme Court decision:217 "The tedious debate between majority 
and dissent on the common law's treatment of [the matter] proved 
only that, when source materials are ambiguous, historical inquiries 
can produce more confusion than understanding."218 That makes 
even more significant the Court's ultimate attempt to provide a rea-
soned explanation for the Watson result: a desire not "to encumber 
213. In cases like Dewey, where the battle has been fought solely in terms of a claimed search 
warrant requirement, the grounds-for-search issue is either ignored or, worse still, alluded to as if 
it had absolutely no relevance in a no-warrant context. 
214. See text at note 132 supra. 
215. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
216. As the Court later made clear, absent exigent circumstances a warrant is needed to 
arrest inside private premises. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
217. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
218. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 182 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
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criminal prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the exis-
tence of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a 
warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like."219 In 
short, a bright-line rule is needed here because of the difficulty in sort-
ing out these arrest cases in terms of actual exigent circumstances. 
Whether this is so, whether - as Justice White once put it - it is 
not possible to make a reasonable judgment about an intended arres-
tee's future availability because it is "very difficult to determine the 
probability of his flight,"220 is certainly not beyond dispute. At a mini-
mum, it would seem that a different bright line, circumscribing the no-
warrant category more narrowly, would be possible. This is because 
empirical evidence indicates that while nearly fifty percent of all ar-
rests are made within two hours of the crime as a result of a "hot" 
search of the crime scene or a "warm" search of the general vicinity of 
the crime, very few additional arrests occur immediately thereafter. 
Rather, there is a delay while further investigation is conducted; about 
forty-five percent of all arrests occur more than a day after the crime, 
and nearly thirty-five percent of all arrests are made after the passage 
of over a week.221 In these latter instances, the risk is negligible that 
the defendant would suddenly flee between the time the police solve 
the case and the time which would be required to obtain and serve an 
arrest warrant. The bright line thus might have been drawn to exclude 
these latter cases. That the Court did not do so may reflect its percep-
tion that the fourth amendment interests involved in Watson were not 
that substantial, a point to which I shall return later. Suffice it to note 
here that when the Court in Chime! v. California was considering in-
stead the search of premises incident to arrest, the majority summarily 
rejected222 the dissenters' claim that the Court's earlier "bright-line" 
rule was necessary because there often is "a strong possibility that con-
federates of the arrested man will in the meanwhile remove the items 
for which the police have probable cause to search."223 
Chime! must in turn be distinguished from the question of how to 
define the circumstances in which police may forgo the warrant re-
quirement for arrests inside private premises.224 This bit of "factual-
ization" remains to be done by the Supreme Court, though the Court 
219. 423 U.S. at 423-24. 
220. Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 779 (1969) (White, J., dissenting). 
221. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 96 (1967). 
222. 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969). 
223. 395 U.S. at 774 (White, J., dissenting). 
224. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
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has hinted at acceptance of the Dorman v. United States 225 test and 
has in one case applied a Dorman factor to achieve a rather questiona-
ble result.226 Dorman is the antithesis of a bright line, for it requires 
the weighing and balancing of a list of imprecise factors, an exercise 
which experience has shown boggles the minds of police andjudges.227 
The Court would thus be well advised to consider some sort of bright-
line formula here, perhaps one which distinguishes "planned" ar-
rests228 from those which the police make as a direct result of being 
out in the field seeking or investigating criminal conduct. 
B. Warrant Protections Unnecessary 
In sharp contrast to the kind of warrant excusal discussed above, 
where the operating assumption is that the warrant process is desirable 
but unfortunately not feasible given the exigencies, other Supreme 
Court decisions permit warrantless fourth amendment activity on the 
apparent theory that the protections of the warrant process are simply 
unnecessary. As suggested earlier, the best light in which to view 
these cases is as grounded in the notion that the warrant process works 
best if it is not overloaded but instead preserved for the protection of 
those fourth amendment interests most deserving of protection. 
Of course, just what those interests are is a matter on which rea-
sonable minds might disagree. In United States v. Chadwick, 229 the 
Court finally "fessed up" that its warrantless-search-of-vehicle cases 
were not grounded in exigent circumstances, as it had theretofore 
claimed, but instead in the "diminished expectation of privacy" in ve-
hicles. But when the government's attorney in the very same case had 
the temerity to suggest that this diminished expectation extended to 
everything but homes, offices, and private communications, the Court 
came down on him like a ton of bricks.230 Apparently the Solicitor 
General had bitten off more than the Court was willing to chew, for as 
matters have developed there are now a considerable number of fourth 
225. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
226. Welsch v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (holding a warrantless entry to arrest for a 
just-completed act of misdemeanor drunk driving was unconstitutional, despite a need to obtain 
evidence of defendant's blood alcohol level). 
227. See Harbaugh & Faust, ''Knock on Any Door" - Home Arrests After Payton and Stea-
gald, 86 DICK. L. REV. 191, 224-25 (1982). 
228. As illustrated by the facts of Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chime! v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
229. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
230. The majority deemed it "a mistake," 433 U.S. at 8; Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dis-
senting, deemed it an "unfortunate" and "extreme view of the Fourth Amendment," 433 U.S. nt 
17; Brennan, J., concurring, agreed "wholeheartedly" with that characterization, 433 U.S. nt 16. 
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amendment interests which do not receive the protections of the war-
rant process. 
But before we examine just what those interests are, it is necessary 
first to take note of another subset of this category (2): those instances 
in which no warrant is required simply because, given the theoretical 
basis of the contemplated activity and the consequent requisite factual 
basis needed to justify it, there would be no meaningful role for the 
magistrate to perform. Yet another subset, discussed herein following 
the other two because it has some characteristics of both, has to do 
with warrantless searches of effects on a "virtual certainty." 
1. Magisterial Inutility 
Perhaps the clearest case of an instance in which the interposition 
of a magistrate would serve no particularly useful purpose is that con-
cerning the inventory of a vehicle in police custody. In South Dakota 
v. Opperman, 231 in which the Court upheld warrantless vehicle inven-
tories, Justice Powell touched on this particular point in his 
concurrence: 
The routine inventory search under consideration in this case does 
not fall within any of the established exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. But examination of the interests which are protected when 
searches are conditioned on warrants issued by a judicial officer reveals 
that none of these is implicated here. A warrant may issue only upon 
"probable cause." ... Inventory searches, however, are not conducted in 
order to discover evidence of crime. The officer does not make a discre-
tionary determination to search based on a judgment that certain condi-
tions are present. Inventory searches are conducted in accordance with 
established police department rules or policy and occur whenever an au-
tomobile is seized. There are thus no special facts for a neutral magis-
trate to evaluate.232 
(Like considerations may determine, in situations where a warrant is 
required, what type is necessary. The fact that an arrest warrant is 
needed to arrest in one's own premises233 while a search warrant is 
needed to take custody of a person then in a third party's premises234 
can be explained on the ground that in the latter instance but not the 
former the nexus-with-the-premises question calls for judicial 
scrutiny.) 
Just when it is that going the warrant route would have no utility 
is not always apparent, and on occasion has sharply divided the Court. 
231. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
232. 428 U.S. at 382-83 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
233. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
234. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
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In Camara v. Municipal Court, 235 the Court, as discussed earlier, held 
that a housing inspection could be conducted without the traditional 
probable cause so long as a particular inspection conformed to "rea-
sonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area 
inspection."236 The Court also ruled that absent the householder's 
consent a warrant was required, though it seems that the magistrate's 
role in this setting is a very limited one. He need not weigh facts as 
with the usual warrant application, as traditional probable cause is 
unnecessary; he is not to evaluate the inspection program itself, as the 
majority says judicial review is to occur "without any reassessment of 
the basic agency decision to canvass an area";237 and he apparently is 
not to address the particularities of what to search for and seize, as no 
particular type of code violation is suspected at the time of warrant 
issuance. This leaves only a determination of whether the particular 
inspection fits within the general scheme, which is not all that unlike 
deciding whether a particular car inventory conforms to standardized 
procedures, a matter the Court later in Opperman appears to have 
concluded was not worth a magistrate's time. It is not too surprising, 
therefore, that the Camara dissenters saw involvement of the magis-
trate as a meaningless act: "These boxcar warrants will be identical as 
to every dwelling in the area, save the street number itself. I daresay 
they will be printed up in pads of a thousand or more - with space for 
the street number to be inserted - and issued by magistrates in broad-
cast fashion as a matter of course. " 238 
This is not to suggest, however, that Camara cannot be squared 
with the later Opperman decision. Having a judicial determination of 
whether the particular contemplated vehicle inventory fits within an 
established plan or procedure may be less necessary because (a) the 
privacy interest in vehicles falls below that in houses; and (b) the in-
ventory risk is not to all vehicles (as inspection is to all residences), but 
only to those already in police custody. But the most likely basis of 
distinction is that the warrant itself serves a function in Camara that is 
unnecessary in an Opperman type of case. As the Camara majority 
stressed, requiring that the inspector have a warrant reassures the 
householder that "the inspector himself is acting under proper author-
ization. " 239 The dispossessed owner of a car needs no like assurance 
as to the inventory of his vehicle when it is already in police custody. 
235. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
236. 387 U.S. at 538. 
237. 387 U.S. at 532. 
238. 387 U.S. at 554 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
239. 387 U.S. at 532. 
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That this reassurance aspect of the warrant process is an impor-
tant, perhaps dominant, consideration in Camara is suggested by sub-
sequent events. In Donovan v. Dewey, 240 authorizing warrantless 
inspection of mines, the court reasoned, in effect, that the operator of a 
pervasively regulated business needed no comparable assurance be-
cause the regulatory scheme itself forewarned the businessman of the 
frequency and scope of the inspections. And in Michigan v. Clif-
ford, 241 where a majority of the Court rejected the Court's earlier 
view242 that an inspection warrant was required for a with-notice post-
fire inspection into the cause of a fire, the conclusion as to the inutility 
of magisterial participation was grounded in the fact that such inspec-
tions are triggered only by an uncontrovertible prior event: a fire of 
unknown origin. The householder therefore has no reason to doubt 
the inspector's authority or to fear he has been arbitrarily selected as 
the focus of official scrutiny. 
2. Lesser Fourth Amendment Interests 
In considering the possible justification of warrantless seizures on 
the ground that the fourth amendment interests involved are "second-
tier" and thus not in need of the added protections of the warrant 
process, it is useful to begin with United States v. Watson. 243 Watson, 
upholding warrantless arrests made in public places, is woefully short 
on analysis, except for the previously discussed asserted need for a 
bright-line rule because of undetectable exigencies.244 But the case 
may be grounded in part in an unstated assumption that taking physi-
cal custody of a person is not a "major" fourth amendment intrusion 
and thus is not in need of advance judicial scrutiny. Such a view of 
Watson helps square it with Gerstein v. Pugh, 245 which requires a judi-
cial probable cause determination as a prerequisite "to extended re-
straint of liberty following arrest" because the "consequences of 
prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occa-
sioned by arrest." 
If this is in fact an undercurrent in Watson, it might be thought to 
reflect a rather distorted set of fourth amendment priorities. As Pro-
fessor Barrett pointed out some years ago, a "police decision to arrest 
an individual and initiate the process of criminal prosecution is in it-
240. 452 U.S. 594 (1981). 
241. 464 U.S. 287 (1984). 
242. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978). 
243. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
244. See text at note 219 supra. 
245. 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). 
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self a significant invasion of personal liberty even though the individ-
ual's innocence is ultimately established":246 there is the indignity of 
arrest, the process of booking and fingerprinting, etc., the acquiring of 
an arrest record, and the subsequent detention until released on bail or 
via Gerstein. By contrast, when only a search is involved, "in terms of 
practical consequences the damage suffered is primarily to property 
interests and is not significantly different from the damage resulting 
from illegal entries by burglars or other criminals."247 For this reason, 
so his argument proceeds, one would expect "that the Fourth Amend-
ment would be applied today in a manner which would give primary 
protection against illegal arrests and similar deprivations of personal 
liberty. "248 
Whether Barrett has his priorities straight is not entirely clear. If I 
were given a multiple-choice test in which my options were either to 
be arrested and tossed in jail or to have my manse subjected to a full 
search, and there was not also a "none of the above" option, I'm not 
quite sure what my choice would be. But even accepting that Barrett's 
assessment of the respective intrusions of arrest and search is correct, 
it does not inevitably follow that the Watson rule is wrong. Given the 
fact that this enterprise of identifying certain lesser fourth amendment 
interests can be justified, if at all, on a desire to keep warrant review 
meaningful by not overburdening the process, there is another ingredi-
ent which belongs in the equation at this point. It is, interestingly 
enough, an ingredient which Barrett himself later supplied: that the 
volume of arrests is so high that if a warrant were required for each 
one except when genuine exigent circumstances were present, the 
courts could not "cope with the added burden."249 In other words, in 
determining whether a warrant should ordinarily be required for a 
particular variety of fourth amendment activity, it is necessary to con-
sider not only the magnitude of the fourth amendment interests in-
volved but also the magnitude of the burden which a warrant 
requirement would place upon the judiciary. This may explain why, 
notwithstanding Watson, the Supreme Court on two occasions went 
out of its way to encourage the practice of taking persons to the station 
on reasonable suspicion for purposes of fingerprinting or possibly 
other identification - but then emphasized that a warrant would be 
246. Barrett, Persona/ Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SUP. Cr. 
REV. 46. 
247. Id. at 47. 
248. Id. 
249. Barrett, Criminal Justice: The Problem of Mass Production, in THE COURTS, THE PUB· 
LIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 85, 118 (1965). 
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required for this even less intrusive but certainly less frequent 
practice. 25° 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court finally abandoned the fiction 
of exigent circumstances as the justification for warrantless searches of 
vehicles, even those in police custody, and now explains the warrant 
excusal primarily on a lesser fourth amendment interests theory. Par-
ticularly noteworthy in this respect is United States v. Chadwick, 251 for 
the Court there found it necessary to specify exactly what it was that 
produced "the diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the 
automobile" and then to determine whether those characteristics were 
likewise attributable to the footlocker subjected to warrantless search 
in that case. As for a vehicle's second-class status, the Court stressed 
these facts: (i) "its function is transportation and it seldom serves as 
one's residence or as the repository of personal effects"; (ii) it "travels 
public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in 
plain view"; (iii) there exist "extensive and detailed codes regulating 
the condition and manner in which motor vehicles may be operated on 
public streets and highways"; and (iv) cars "periodically undergo offi-
cial inspection, and they are often taken into police custody in the 
interest of public safety."252 A warrant was required for the foot-
locker, the court next concluded, for none of those four characteristics 
was applicable to it; rather, luggage is "not open to public view," is 
"not ... subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a con-
tinuing basis," and "is intended as a repository of personal e:tfects."253 
The distinction may have seemed not totally implausible in Chad-
wick, where the luggage was a 200-pound footlocker secured by both a 
padlock and a regular trunk lock. But it began to dissolve when the 
Court thereafter decided Arkansas v. Sanders, 254 holding a warrant 
was required for search of the luggage in that case as well. For one 
thing, unlike Chadwick, where it could be said the luggage had a tenu-
ous connection with the vehicle because it had been placed into the 
open trunk just moments before its seizure, Sanders involved a suitcase 
earlier placed in the trunk of a cab which was later stopped by the 
police. For another, and more important, the suitcase was unlocked, 
and thus there was no basis for asserting (as one might have as to the 
situation in Chadwick) that a higher privacy expectation could be at-
tributed to the rather extraordinary security measures taken. If, as 
250. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
251. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
252. 433 U.S. at 12-13. 
253. 433 U.S. at 13. 
254. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
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Sanders held, that suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle was entitled to 
the protections of the warrant process, then it was difficult to see why 
the result should be any different had the contents of that suitcase (but 
not the case) been in that trunk. This is because, to put the matter in 
terms of the four points made in Chadwick, (i) people do use the 
trunks of cars as "the repository of personal effects"; (ii) what is in the 
trunk is not "in plain view"; (iii) limits on how cars may be operated 
have little to do with what is in the trunk of a car; and (iv) "official 
inspection" does not, at least without advance notice, result in scrutiny 
of places in cars where personal effects might be stored. 
What Chadwick and Sanders did have in common was that in both 
instances there was probable cause to search the container only and 
not the vehicle at large, and that turned out to be the point of limita-
tion on the warrant-for-luggage-in-cars requirement. Such was the 
holding in United States v. Ross, 255 about which it will suffice to say 
that the curious distinction drawn there is probably about the best that 
could be done if the Court was unwilling to turn away from either 
Chadwick-Sanders on the one hand or Chambers v. Maroney 256 and its 
progeny on the other. But there is a moral to all this: when the expla-
nation for characterizing something as a lesser fourth amendment in-
terest is no more convincing than it was in Chadwick, trouble further 
down the path of fourth amendment "factualization" is to be expected. 
Further reflection upon the Supreme Court's decisions concerning 
the warrant requirement as it relates to effects reveals another distinc-
tion, one which has considerably more going for it than that drawn in 
Chadwick The general point is that the protection of privacy interests 
is deemed more important than the protection of possessory interests, 
so that a warrant is generally required as to the former but not the 
latter. Illustrative of this point is Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 257 where 
the Court elaborated the "plain view" doctrine. The essence of the 
Court's explanation was that if in the course of the lawful execution of 
a search warrant the police find an item not named in that warrant 
(and not improperly omitted therefrom),258 they may seize it on prob-
able cause without first obtaining a magistrate's authorization. This is 
because, the Court explained, "the magistrate's scrutiny is intended to 
eliminate altogether searches not based on probable cause,"259 not a 
255. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
256. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
257. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
258. This is the most rational interpretation of the Coolidge requirement that the discovery 
have been "inadvertent." 
259. 403 U.S. at 467. 
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problem on such facts because the search had already been authorized 
and conducted. This left only the pending act of dispossession, that is, 
the seizure from the defendant's custody or control, which presented 
only a "minor peril to Fourth Amendment protections"260 and thus 
could proceed without a warrant. 
Much the same reasoning was involved in the "controlled deliv-
ery" case of Illinois v. Andreas,261 holding that where the contents of a 
package were lawfully examined by the authorities as it passed 
through customs and a delivery of that package was arranged by po-
lice, promptly after which the recipient was arrested and the package 
taken from him and opened, no warrant was needed. There was a 
seizure, but given the prior lawful viewing "the subsequent reopening 
... is not a 'search.' " 262 If the situation is the reverse of that in Coo-
lidge and Andreas, that is, if the police make a privacy intrusion but 
not a possessory one, then chances are a warrant is required. Such is 
the teaching of Walter v. United States, 263 holding that if a private 
party to whom a package was misdelivered turns it over to the police, 
the police still need a warrant to scrutinize more closely264 the con-
tents of that package. This is because, the Court explained in Walter, 
under the Sanders rule265 "an officer's authority to possess a package is 
distinct from his authority to examine its contents.''266 
3. "Virtual Certainty" of Contents 
The third subset of this category (2) - concerning, again, when 
the warrant process is deemed unnecessary - combines characteris-
tics of the preceding two. For one thing, the fourth amendment inter-
ests involved are of a lesser variety, though the situations fall slightly 
short of the Coolidge plain view. For another, though it cannot be said 
that there would be no role for the magistrate to perform in the Opper-
man sense, the circumstances are such that error seems unlikely even 
absent antecedent judicial scrutiny. The starting point here is now-
notorious footnote 13 of the Sanders case: 
260. 403 U.S. at 467. 
261. 463 U.S. 765 (1983). 
262. 463 U.S. at 772. 
263. 447 U.S. 649 (1980). 
264. In United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), the Court held it was no search for 
the police to open the container to the extent it had previously been opened by the private person 
turning the container over to them. 
265. The Court there, though holding the suitcase in the vehicle could not be searched with-
out a warrant, indicated a warrantless seizure of it while a warrant was sought would be permis-
sible. 442 U.S. at 761-62. 
266. 447 U.S. at 654. 
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Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of 
a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. 
Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) 
by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy because their contents can be inf erred from their outward appear-
ance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to 
"plain view," thereby obviating the need for a warrant.267 
Putting aside the truly plain view situation in which the officer's 
senses directly perceive the contents (including where the container is 
partly open or transparent),268 what is footnote 13 intended to cover? 
Certainly it makes sense to include here plain view once-removed, as 
where, to use the language of the plurality in Robbins v. California, 269 
"the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents." 
This covers the "gun case" paradigm in Sanders but not the "kit of 
burglar tools" illustration, for the latter has no "distinctive configura-
tion." The "factualization" in footnote 13 thus includes an inherent 
ambiguity: was the burglar tools hypothetical merely an ill-considered 
example, or was it intended to suggest there are still other situations in 
which no warrant is required? 
The Robbins case illustrates the significance of this question, for 
each of the packages searched in that case resembled "an oversized, 
extra-long cigar box with slightly rounded corners and edges," 
"wrapped or boxed in an opaque material covered by an outer wrap-
ping of transparent, cellophane-type plastic," and "sealed on the 
outside with at least one strip of opaque tape."270 The state court de-
clared these packages had the appearance of wrapped bricks of mari-
juana and thus fell within footnote 13, but the Robbins plurality in 
concluding to the contrary asserted that to come within footnote 13 "a 
container must so clearly announce its contents, whether by its distinc-
tive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are 
obvious to an observer."271 Given the result in Robbins, the "or other-
wise" part of the language just quoted seems to mean at least this: 
even if the contents of the container are not in plain view or plain view 
once-removed (i.e., because of a "distinctive configuration"), the pro-
tections of the warrant clause of the fourth amendment still do not 
come into play when there is (i) a high degree of certainty about the 
267. 442 U.S. at 764 n.13. 
268. See, e.g., Tillman v. State, 275 Ark. 275, 630 S.W.2d 5 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1201 (1983) (garment bag partially open); Commonwealth v. lnvin, 391 Mass. 765, 463 N.E.2d 
1178 (1984) (marijuana visible through container). 
269. 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981). 
270. 453 U.S. at 422 n.l. 
271. 453 U.S. at 428. 
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contents of the container, and (ii) this certainty is ascertained from the 
nature of the container itself. 
The first of these possible requirements leads to Texas v. Brown, 272 
where after a lawful stopping of a car an officer saw the driver drop a 
knotted opaque party balloon onto the seat and then observed several 
small plastic vials, quantities of loose white powder and an open pack 
of party balloons in the glove compartment. As to defendant's objec-
tion to the warrantless seizure of the balloon, the Brown plurality up-
held it as based on probable cause, which at first blush looks as if 
footnote 13 of Sanders had hypertrophied to the point of consuming 
the Sanders holding. But this is not so. The defendant in Brown inex-
plicably challenged only the warrantless seizure of the balloon, and 
thus the case fits comfortably with those discussed earlier concerning 
warrantless seizure of effects. Of significance here, however, is the 
statement of three Justices in Brown that what would justify a war-
rantless search of a container, absent either exigent circumstances or 
probable cause to search the car in which the container is found, is "a 
degree of certainty that is equivalent to the plain view of the heroin 
itself," that is, a "virtual certainty that the balloon contained a con-
trolled substance. "273 
Whether upon further "factualization" of the fourth amendment 
this "virtual certainty" test will evolve as the standard under footnote 
13 remains to be seen. (Shortly after Brown, the Court in a somewhat 
analogous situation utilized a less demanding - and, it would seem, 
more ambiguous - test.)274 At least on a theoretical level, this "vir-
tual certainty" approach has something going for it; given the other 
situations now well established as falling into category (2), it certainly 
may be argued that the warrant process is just as unnecessary when 
the fourth amendment interests are low and the certainty about the 
container's contents is high. Whether it would work well in practice is 
272. 460 U.S. 730 (1983). 
273. 460 U.S. at 751 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring). As they 
observed: 
Sometimes there can be greater certainty about the identity of a substance within a 
container than about the identity of a substance that is actually visible. One might actually 
see a white powder without realizing that it is heroin, but be virtually certain a balloon 
contains such a substance in a particular context. It seems to me that in evaluating whether 
a person's privacy interests are infringed, "virtual certainty" is a more meaningful indicator 
than visibility. 
460 U.S. at 751 n.5. 
274. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983), where the question was whether a container, 
previously lawfully opened and then the subject of a controlled delivery, could be reopened with-
out a warrant when there had been a short break in the police surveillance. The court answered 
in the affirmative, holding "that absent a substantial likelihood that the contents have been 
changed, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of a container previously 
opened under lawful authority." 463 U.S. at 773. 
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another matter, which naturally raises for consideration the second 
possible requirement enumerated earlier: that this virtual certainty 
must arise from (to use the words of footnote 13) the "very nature" of 
the container. Although this might seem to be one way to keep the 
"virtual certainty" category within meaningful bounds, such a limita-
tion would appear to be the likely source of a great deal of mischief. 
The fact of the matter, as both Robbins215 and Brown 276 convincingly 
illustrate, is that it is not easy to separate out the nature of the 
container from the circumstances of its possession or transportation. 
Does this mean that a "virtual certainty" category should be lim-
ited not at all by the source of the information so that, for example, it 
could exist when the container is totally innocuous but the police 
gained information about its contents from an informant with ex-
traordinary credentials? Probably not. For one thing, such an open-
ended warrant exception, not limited to first-hand perception of the 
police concerning the container and the circumstances of its use, 
would increase the risk of erroneous police decisions on the "virtual 
certainty" question. For another, it would outrun the rationale of foot-
note 13, which is that a person can lose any reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a container by the way in which he uses it. 
What then of incriminating admissions by the defendant as to the 
contents of a container? This should suffice, Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded in Robbins, for the defendant "could have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the contents of the garbage bags" in light of his 
admissions to the police that they contained marijuana.277 This is an 
attractive conclusion, for the act of stating to police the contents of the 
container is much like revealing the contents by using a transparent 
container.278 An unequivocal incriminating admission regarding the 
contents of the container leaves virtually no doubt as to what those 
contents are; by contrast, whether the officer's expertise and experi-
ence permit the conclusion that certain types of containers are very 
275. If one were to ask in that case whether there was a "virtual certainty" that the packages 
contained marijuana, certainly one would consider not only that they were found in the luggage 
compartment after the officers had already discovered marijuana in the passenger compartment, 
but also defendant's statement that "[w]hat you are looking for is in the back." 453 U.S. at 442 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
276. If one were to ask in that case whether there was a "virtual certainty," one would 
consider not only the knotted balloon but also the fact that it had been seen within a car in which 
there were also observed several small plastic vials and quantities of loose white powder. 
277. 453 U.S. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
278. The analogy is most compelling when the statement is as to the entire contents of the 
container. If a person tells the police he has a stolen diamond ring in his suitcase, it might be 
argued that this is not a surrender of his privacy expectation regarding the contents of the case 
generally. 
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likely used only to hold illegal drugs arguably is precisely the kind of 
question as to which the judgment of a neutral and detached magis-
trate would be beneficial. 
V. DENOUEMENT 
Back in 1950, Frank Allen - having noted that the Supreme 
Court, by distinguishing various forms of speech activity, had brought 
a degree of rationality to first amendment jurisprudence decidedly 
lacking in the Court's fourth amendment decisions - suggested the 
need for a "process of 'factualization' in the search and seizure 
cases. "279 In the intervening years, the Court has pursued that process 
in a multitude of cases, generally with favorable results. Recognition 
that "probable cause" should be variegated has contributed substan-
tially to a more meaningful balancing of privacy and law-enforcement 
interests. Likewise, appreciation that a warrant-unless-absolutely-im-
possible approach is unsound and that in fact warrants are impractica-
ble or unnecessary in diverse circumstances has also had a salubrious 
effect upon fourth amendment jurisprudence. 
This is not to say that I agree with the result in each of the cases 
discussed herein, for I do not. Nor is this to suggest that I subscribe to 
the Court's "factualization" reasoning in each instance, for I do not. 
But merely because I and others might not concur in all of the 
Supreme Court's efforts in this direction hardly suggests that the "fac-
tualization" undertaking has not been worthwhile. Rather, it is 
merely a natural manifestation of the difficulty of the enterprise. A 
"monolith"280 style fourth amendment, away from which we have 
moved over a course of years, is hardly desirable, but then "a fourth 
amendment with all of the character and consistency of a Rorschach 
blot"281 is no less pernicious. Steering between such Scylla and Cha-
rybdis is no mean task. It requires, inter alia, careful assessment of the 
respective merits of bright-line and ad hoc style "factualization"; com-
parative evaluation of the reasonable suspicion, standardized-proce-
dures, and "piggy-back" modes of departure from traditional probable 
cause; and thoughtful calculation of just what makes the warrant pro-
cess feasible and efficacious. 
Allen expressed the hope in 1950 that by a process of factualiza-
tion there would result, among other things, a relaxing of tensions. 
The extent to which this has occurred may be open to dispute; I am 
279. Allen, supra note 10, at 4. 
280. Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 388. 
281. Id. at 375. 
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sure some would point to the fact that most of the cases discussed 
earlier evoked rather sharp divisions on the Court. But this again may 
reflect nothing more than the inherent difficulty of the "factualization" 
process. Certainly the tensions are not what they would have been if, 
for example, full-fledged arrests and street-corner encounters were still 
subjected to precisely the same fourth amendment limitations. 
Allen also saw the process of "factualization" as a way to move 
fourth amendment law out of its then "state of unstable equilib-
rium. "282 Here, too, I am sure not all observers of the fourth amend-
ment scene would reach the same conclusion about the extent to 
which this desirable end has been achieved. Certainly not all of the 
Court's cases can be reconciled, and there remain significant doubts as 
to just how the Court would or should come out on a variety of un-
resolved fourth amendment issues. But certainly there has been noth-
ing in recent years (not even the Court's difficulties with the cars 
versus containers distinction) which even approaches the Marron to 
Go-Bart to Harris to Trupiano to Rabinowitz vacillation2sJ which 
prompted Allen's comment. A significant degree of stability has been 
achieved. Moreover, as the Court takes on more fourth amendment 
cases and continues with the process of "factualization," so that it may 
to an even greater degree "see in the round rather than the flat, and 
... gain some understanding of the whole in action,"284 there is every 
reason to hope that greater stabilization and reduction of tensions will 
occur. 
As Frank Allen has put it: "There is ground for optimism. It is 
high time. "285 
282. Allen, supra note 10, at 4. 
283. See text at notes 65-72 supra. 
284. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 263 (1960). 
285. Allen, supra note 13, at 542. 
